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SUMMARY
The major objective of this dissertation is extending the capabilities of game theoretic
distributed control to more general settings. In particular, we are interested in drifting
environments and/or constrained communications.
The first part of the dissertation concerns slowly varying dynamics, i.e., drifting envi-
ronments. A standard assumption in game theoretic learning is a stationary environment,
e.g., the game is fixed. We investigate the case of slow variations and show that for suffi-
ciently slow time variations, the limiting behavior “tracks” the stochastically stable states.
Since the analysis is regarding Markov processes, the results could be applied to vari-
ous game theoretic learning rules. In this research, the results were applied to log-linear
learning. A mobile sensor coverage example was tested in both simulation and laboratory
experiments.
The second part considers a problem of coordinating team players’ actions without
any communications in team-based zero-sum games. Generally, some global signalling
devices are required for common randomness between players, but communications are
very limited or impossible in many practical applications. Instead of learning a one-shot
strategy, we let players coordinate a periodic sequence of deterministic actions and put an
assumption on opponent’s rationality. Since team players’ action sequences are periodic
and deterministic, common randomness is no longer required to coordinate players. It is
proved that if a length of a periodic action sequence is long enough, then opponents with
limited rationality cannot recognize its pattern. Because the opponents cannot recognize
that the players are playing deterministic actions, the players’ behavior looks like a corre-
lated and randomized joint strategy with empirical distribution of their action sequences.
Consequently players can coordinate their action sequences without any communications
or global signals, and the resulting action sequences have correlated behavior.
x
Moreover, the notion of micro-players are introduced for efficient learning of long ac-
tion sequences. Micro-player matching approach provides a new framework that converts
the original team-based zero-sum game to a game between micro-players. By introducing
a de Bruijn sequence to micro-player matching, we successfully separate the level of op-
ponent’s rationality and the size of the game of micro-players. The simulation results are
shown to demonstrate the performance of micro-player matching methods.
Lastly, the results of the previous two topics are combined by considering a problem of
coordinating actions without communications in drifting environments. More specifically,
it is assumed that the opponent player in the team-based zero-sum games tries to adjust its
strategy in the set of bounded recall strategies. Then the time-varying opponent’s strategy
can be considered as a dynamic environment parameter in a coordination game between
the team players. Additionally, we develop a human testbed program for further study
regarding a human as an adaptive opponent in the team-based zero-sum games. The devel-
oped human testbed program can be a starting point for studying game theoretic correlated




Multi-agent systems have been received tremendous attention for their capability to solve
problems that are impossible or challenging for a single agent. Compared with single-agent
systems and centralized approaches, multi-agent systems provide a more natural framework
for many problems such as resource allocation and team planning. Moreover multi-agent
systems are robust in the sense that if an agent in a system has broken or failed then other
agents can still maintain the system. A precise definition of ‘agents’ in multi-agent sys-
tems can be a little bit different for different researchers. But generally, entities that au-
tonomously make local decisions and interact with other agents and/or environments are
considered as agents. Robots, humans or even software without a physical body can be
agents for a multi-agent system.
One of the most important characteristics of multi-agent systems is the absence of a
centralized structure. Even though a system may have multiple entities, if there exists a
designated one that can observe the system’s global state and control the global behavior,
then the system can be considered a single-agent system. Therefore control algorithms for
multi-agent systems are inherently distributed control.
Coordinating a team of agents to achieve collective goals is usually a major objective
of control design for multi-agent systems. However designing such control without cen-
tralized structures is generally more difficult than centralized system design. An agent’s
decision is based on local information and it influences directly and indirectly other agents.
It may result in undesired global behaviors and increase the complexity of the system.
Game theory has received considerable attention as a new paradigm for multi-agent
systems and distributed control because of its many advantages, such as minimal com-
munication requirements, robustness to failures and environmental disturbances, and scal-
ability [1]. Of specific interest in the game theory literature is game theoretic learning
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[2, 3, 4]. Game theoretic approaches model a system as a non-cooperative game between
self-interested agents, and establish simple algorithms that converge to the emergent equi-
librium of the game with desired global behavior. The relevance to engineered systems is
that distributed components can be incentivized through the appropriate design of a game
whose equilibria represent a desirable operating condition. A representative reference is
[5] which presents connections between game theoretic learning and various cooperative
control problems. There exists a rich set of applications based on game theoretic designs,
including mobile sensor coverage problems [6], wind energy harvesting [7], vehicle-target
assignment [8], power management in sensor networks [9] and ad hoc networks [10].
The major objective of this research is extending the capabilities of game theoretic
distributed control to more general settings. In particular, we are interested in drifting
environments and/or constrained communications.
First, we consider game theoretic learning in drifting environments. The standard game
theoretic learning assumes that environments in which agents are interacting each others
are not time-varying. Therefore, in such static environments, the same joint action of agents
always gives the same results regardless of the time when the actions are played. However
there are many engineering systems with dynamic and time dependent environments, and
analyzing game theoretic learnings in such environments is essential for these settings.
We define ‘drifting environments’ as a type of dynamic environment whose changing
speed is limited and slow. It is shown that a stochastically stable state, which is a notion
of stability in game theory literature, is also drifting with limited speed in such drifting
environments. We proved that game theoretic learnings can track the drifting stochastically
stable states if their drifting speed is slow enough. The number of existing learning algo-
rithms in the literature is large, so analyzing each one of those algorithms one-by-one is
unrealistic. Instead, we analyze robustness of stochastic stability of Markov process within
a drifting environment. Because many adaptive learning algorithms can be modeled as
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Markov processes, Markov process based analysis validates performance of various learn-
ing algorithms. In this thesis, log-linear learning [11, 5, 12] was analyzed under the drifting
environment setting as an illustrated example. Then the results were tested with a sensor
coverage problem in both simulations and laboratory experiments with mobile robots.
The second part of this thesis considers the problem of coordinating a team of agents
without communications. In general cooperative multi-agent control settings, agents com-
municate with each other to exchange their local information. Many difficulties in design-
ing multi-agent systems are inherited from asymmetry of information among agents. Hence
how and what information is shared among agents is one of the most important concerns in
multi-agent systems. If agents could communicate information without any cost and delay
then all information in the system would be shared globally. In this case, one can apply a
centralized control to coordinate agents in the system. Unfortunately, communications be-
tween agents are not free in many multi-agent systems. It often requires time and resources,
and sometimes it is even impossible because of various practical reasons.
Another problem concerning communication is a security issue under the existence of
hostile opponents or environments. There are many strategic situations in which a group
of players has to coordinate their plans while these are hidden from outside of the group.
In baseball games, a pitcher and a catcher communicate through a series of hand signals
and it is very important to make sure that the hitter is not stealing their signs. Allied armies
in a war utilize cryptography to keep their coordinated plans secret from enemies. Even
though messages are encrypted in such situations, communication always has a security
risk as long as there are hostile opponents that can take advantage of the communicated
information.
The main idea of coordinating players without communications is adapting a player’s
periodic action sequence instead of a randomized one-shot action strategy. Globally observ-
able signals or communication between players are required because common randomness
is needed for coordination. If players’ actions are deterministic periodic sequences so that
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common randomness is not needed, then players can coordinate their joint actions without
communications. We put an assumption on opponents’ rationality and it is proved that a
pattern of players’ actions is not recognized by such opponents. However learning a series
of actions instead of one mixed action is generally very slow because of the increased size
of the space in which the learning process is searching the optimal point.
To adapt a long action sequence efficiently, we introduce a notion of micro-players and
micro-player matching methods. Micro-players are virtual entities within an actual player
who wants to adapt a periodic action sequence. Like general players, each micro-player
has its own internal states and adapts its one-shot action whenever it is selected by the
actual player who contains it. Then the actual player can play a periodic action sequence
by selecting a micro-player with a periodic order. In micro-player matching, all players
have the same periodic order of micro-players. Then the original game between players is
converted to a corresponding game among micro-players.
Lastly, this thesis joins the previous two topics together by considering game theoretic
learnings in drifting environments without communications. A team of players coordinates
their actions without communications and their opponent also adapts their own strategies.
The opponent who dynamically adapts its strategy plays a role as dynamic environments
from the team players’ point of view. If the opponent’s learning speed is slow enough
relative to the team players learning, then the robustness result of stochastic stability can
be applied.
Additionally, we suggest an interesting research direction that considers a human as the
limited-rationality opponent. The exact learning mechanism of humans is not understood
yet, and understanding it is beyond the scope of this research. But apparently, a human is
also an agent who learns and adapts his/her actions with limited rationality. Therefore we
believe that testing our algorithms against human participants is worthwhile. A graphical
user interface is developed as a human testbed program for experiments with human partic-
ipants. With the developed testbed program, experiment participants play a game against a
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team of virtual players coordinating their actions using micro-player matching.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents some important background
for game theoretic learning. Mathematical notations are also defined in this chapter. Then
game theoretic learnings in drifting environments and limited communication are sepa-
rately studied in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Chapter 5 combines those results. Finally,




A major goal of distributed control is developing underlying theories for design and control
of multi-agent systems in which interacting subsystems make local decisions based on local
information. Game theory from economics concerns mathematical models of interacting
decision makers, hence one can easily find the relevance between distributed control and
game theory. However many game theoretic results from the economic literature cannot be
directly applied to distributed control in engineering. A major reason is that game theory
analyzes existing social systems from a descriptive point of view but engineering system
design requires a prescriptive framework [1].
Some recent research such as [1] and [13] provide an architectural view that adopts
game theory as a prescriptive tool for distributed control system design. The proposed ar-
chitecture in [1, 13] modularizes game theoretic control into two components: (i) utility
design which defines individual agents’ local interest, and (ii) learning design which de-
fines local decision making rules. This decoupling can be obtained by enforcing a certain
structure on the game [1]. The enforced structure becomes an interface between utility
design and learning design, and simplifies design processes. The interface requires utility
design to ensure that the resulting game has a specific structure and requires learning design
to provide desired behavior when it is applied to the game structure.
This modularization allows a general design framework rather than application-specific
designs. Distributed control problems involve various constraint settings, and developing
designs subject to such application-specific constraints is generally a difficult task. By
this modularized architectural view, application system designers would choose a specific
utility design and learning design from a rich set of developed general designs according to
constraints of the application.
The rest of this chapter will present game theoretic background related to this research,
6
as well as stochastic stability and some game theoretic learning rules.
2.1 Game theory
2.1.1 Equilibria of a game
Let P = {P1,P2, ...,Pn} be a set of n-players, and Ai be a set of available actions for
each player i. This research will assume that P andAi are always finite. LetA be the set of
joint actions, i.e., A =
∏
i∈N Ai. The payoff function (or utility function) for each player
P i is Ui : A → R. Then one can define a game G as a tuple G = 〈P , {Ai}i∈P , {Ui}i∈P〉.
For convenience, let a−i be the collection of actions of players other than P i, i.e.,
a−i = (a1, a2, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., an).
A Nash equilibrium is the most central solution concepts in non-cooperative games.











A Nash equilibrium is a stable strategy in the sense that no player has an incentive to
change his action unilaterally from a current action profile. Game can have zero, one or
multiple pure Nash equilibria. Let ∆(Ai) be the set of all probability vectors over Ai. If
players are allowed to randomize or ‘mix’ his actions then every game G has at least one
Nash equilibrium. A mixed strategy pi ∈ ∆(Ai) stochastically selects a pure action with a
fixed probability pi.
Even though a Nash equilibrium is a result based on the logic that each player tries to
maximizing his own welfare, it may not be the ‘optimal’ action profile for the game from
the point of an outside observer’s view. A prisoner’s dilemma is a classic example of a
non-optimal Nash equilibrium. Consider a set of player P = {P1,P2} with an action
set A = {{C,D}, {C,D}}. In other words, each player can choose either Cooperate or





The first player P1 selects row and the second player P2 selects column. Then the first
elements of the selected pair is the utility for P1 and the second elements is the utility for
P2. Considering the average utility, the joint action (C,C) yields the best result for the
players. However if one player decides to cooperate, then another player can increase his
utility by choosing to defect. Hence (C,C) is not a Nash equilibrium, and the only Nash
equilibrium of the game is (D,D) which receives the lowest average utility.
Efficiency of equilibrium can be measured by price of anarchy (PoA) and price of sta-
bility (PoS) [14]. Define global welfare as φ : A → R. Let E(G) denote the set of










where aNE ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium and aopt ∈ arg max
a∗∈A
φ(a∗) is an optimal joint action
profile. Hence PoA and PoS give a lower bound and a upper bound on the global welfare
achieved by any Nash equilibrium respectively. In general, the price of anarchy can be
arbitrarily close to 0. If there exists more than one equilibrium, selecting a equilibrium
with larger global welfare is an important consideration when designing learning rules.
2.1.2 Game structures
We will introduce the following three classes of games structures; identical interest games,
potential games, and weakly acyclic games. Generally in engineered multi-agent systems,
there exists a global objective function φ : A → R that system designers want to maximize.
In such systems, it is important to align individual players’ utility functions with a global
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objective function. Note that the key difference between these classes is the degree of the
alignment between players’ utility functions and the global objective function.
In identical interest games, each player’s local utility function is equal to a global ob-
jective function. Identical interest games can be considered as one of the most restrictive
form of games for cooperative control. Local agents in many applications are not able
to measure global welfares, and such application systems cannot be modeled as identical
interest games.
Definition 2.1.2. A game, G, is an identical interest game if it satisfies the following prop-
erty for some function φ : A → R
Ui(a) = φ(a)
for every player P i and for every joint action a ∈ A.
It is trivial to verify that every identical interest game has at least one pure Nash equilibrium
and any action profile a maximizing φ is a Nash equilibrium.
The class of potential games [15], which is a generalization of identical interest games,
has been considered as one of the most powerful interfaces for modularization. In potential
games, each agent’s local interest is not exactly same as a global objective, but aligned with
it.
Definition 2.1.3. A game G, is a potential game [15] if it satisfies the following property.
There exists a potential function φ : A → R, such that for all a = (ai, a−i) ∈ A and
a′ = (a′i, a−i) ∈ A,
φ(ai, a−i)− φ(a′i, a−i) = Ui(ai, a−i)− Ui(a′i, a−i).
Every potential game has at least one pure Nash equilibria. Connection between coop-
erative control and potential games is well studied by [5, 16]. There exist lots of learning
algorithms for potential games such as Joint Strategy Fictitious Play (JSFP) [17], log-linear
learning[11, 5, 12], dynamic fictitious play [18], and others [19, 20, 21].
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Marginal contribution utility, which is sometimes referred to as Wonderful Life Utility
(WLU) [22], is one of promising utility designs that lead to a potential game. WLU is a
player’s marginal contribution to a global objective, i.e.,
Ui(ai, a−i) = φ(ai, a−i)− φ(a∅i , a−i)
where a∅i indicates a null action.
Weakly acyclic games [23, 4] are a more general class of potential games in the sense
that it requires less structure. To explain a definition of weakly acyclic games, consider a
game G with better reply dynamics as follows. Suppose that only one player is allowed
to move at a time, and the player moves in a way to increase his own utility. Let P i(t)
be a player who is selected to move at time t. Then a better reply path is a sequence of
action profile a(1), a(2), a(3), ...a(T ) that, for every index t < T , ai(t)(t) 6= ai(t)(t + 1),
a−i(t)(t) = a−i(t)(t + 1), and Ui(t)(a(t)) < Ui(t)(a(t + 1)). The definition of a weakly
acyclic game is as follows.
Definition 2.1.4. A game G is a weakly acyclic game if for every a ∈ A, there exists a
better reply path starting at a and ending at some pure Nash equilibrium of G.
The following proposition identifies the similarities between potential games and weakly
acyclic games.
Proposition 2.1.1. A game G is weakly acyclic if and only if there exists a potential func-
tion φ : A → R such that for any action a ∈ A that is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists
a player P i with an action a′i ∈ Ai such that
Ui(ai, a−i)− Ui(a′i, a−i)→ φ(ai, a−i)− φ(a′i, a−i).
This class of games captures various problems in cooperative games, such as congestion
games, distributed routing in networks, and area coverage [19]. Many learning algorithms
such as [19, 21, 4] are developed for weakly acyclic games. Note that identical interest
games and potential games are special cases of weakly acyclic games. Figure 1 illustrates
relations between game structures.
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Figure 1: Relations between game structures
2.2 Stochastic stability
Game theoretic learning concerns adaptive learning rules and their convergence to equilib-
rium concepts such as Nash equilibrium. One of the important convergence concepts in
game theoretic learning is stochastic stability which was originally introduced in [20].
For x ∈ Rn, |x| denotes the usual Euclidean norm, and ‖M‖ denotes the associated
induced matrix norm. The vector 1 denotes a column vector
(
1 1 ... 1
)T
of appro-
priate context dependent dimension. |Z| denotes the number of elements of the finite set,




∣∣ 1Tx = 1, xi ≥ 0} .
Let Sn denote the set of all n×n stochastic matrices, i.e., matrices with non-negative entries
whose rows sum to one. Any P ∈ Sn defines a Markov chain over some state space Z with
|Z| = n, where the ijth element of P , Pij , denotes the transition probability from state
i ∈ Z to state j ∈ Z. In case P has a single aperiodic recurrent class [24], there exists a
unique stationary distribution µ ∈ ∆(n) such that
µTP = µ
and for all x ∈ ∆(n),
lim
t→∞
xTP t = µT.
The following definitions are adopted from the presentations in [20] and [23].
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Definition 2.2.1. Let P 0 ∈ Sn define a Markov chain onZ = {1, 2, ..., n}. Let
{
P ε
∣∣ ε ∈ (0, ε̄]} ⊂
Sn define a family Markov chains on Z. The family {P ε} is a regular perturbation of P 0
if i) each P ε has a single aperiodic recurrent class; ii) for each i, j ∈ Z,
lim
ε→0
P εij = P
0
ij;




where µε is the unique stationary distribution of P ε.







The interpretation is that a stochastically stable state has non-vanishing occupancy fre-
quency for small ε as t → ∞ and other states will be almost vanished. As an intuitive
example, consider a three state Markov process P 0. Let {S1, S2, S3} be a set of states and







It is obvious that every state is stationary in this system.
Now consider a regular perturbed Markov process P ε.
P ε =

1− ε2 ε2 0
0 1− ε ε
ε 0 1− ε
 .
Figure 2 illustrates state transition diagrams of P 0 and P ε. Assume the value ε is very small.
Then a probability that a state deviates from S2 or S3 is ε while a probability deviating from
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(a) Markov chain P 0 (b) P ε which is a regular perturbation of P 0
Figure 2: State transition diagrams of P 0 and P ε. For P 0, all states are stable. But for P ε,
S1 is the only stochastically stable state.
S1 is ε2 which is much smaller than ε. One can easily expect that a state of the system will
spend most of times at S1 after a time long enough, and occupancy frequency of S2 and S3
will goes to zero as ε converges to zero. Therefore S1 is the only stochastically stable state
of the system. The robustness of stochastic stability will be analyzed in Chapter 3.
2.3 Game theoretic learning
This section introduces some game theoretic learning algorithms related to this research.
Game theoretic learning is about how players can learn to play desired joint action profiles
such as a Nash equilibrium through repeated interactions [2, 25, 26, 27]. For repeated
game settings, let ai(t) and pi(t) denote the realized action and mixed strategy of P i at
time t. All learning algorithms discussed in this thesis are based on the following process.
At each time t = 1, 2, 3, ..., each player P1 simultaneously selects its action ai(t) ∈ Ai
with a probability pi(t) ∈ ∆(Ai). Then it receives its utility Ui(ai(t), a−i(t)) and adjust its
strategy pi using local information. A range of local information which is accessible by a
player may vary based on the system’s attributes. Game theoretic learning rules define the
strategy adjustment mechanism of players.
Because of the large number of existing learning algorithms in this literature, learning
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algorithms introduced here are only a small part of the entire game theoretic learnings. One
can refer to other references like [2, 4, 28] for more kinds of learning algorithms.
2.3.1 Payoff-based dynamics
One of the criteria to categorize general game theoretic learning rules is the information
dependency of individual player’s learning rules. A learning rule is called ‘uncoupled’ if a
player’s strategy does not depend on other players’ payoffs. It is called ‘radically uncou-
pled’ or ‘payoff-based’ if a player’s strategy does not depend on other players’ payoffs and
actions.
The payoff based setting is considered as the most restrictive observational condition for
agents in multi-agent systems [19]. In a payoff based scenario, no form of communication
is allowed, and a player only has information about the action it played and (possibly noisy)
the reward it received. A player with a payoff-based learning is not aware of the presence
of other players so that he has to adapt its strategy only based on history of its own realized
payoffs and actions. In many practical systems, the precise payoff structure is unknown
to players and a player cannot observe actions of other players. Therefore this ‘payoff-
based’ condition is often a reasonable requirement when designing learning rules. There
are payoff based learning rules like [19, 12, 29, 30] in game theoretic control literature.
Developing payoff based learning rules that converge to correlated strategies is not
trivial because of the lack of correlating devices such as communications or global signal
devices. Chapter 4 demonstrates a payoff-based method to achieve performance close to
correlated strategies without communications between players.
2.3.2 Log-linear learning
Log-linear learning, introduced in [11] and further developed in [5, 12], is a learning al-
gorithm for potential games. Some variants of standard log-linear learning such as binary
log-linear learning and payoff-based log-linear learning are employed in this proposal. The
algorithm of log-linear learning proceeds as follows. At each stage t > 0, a single agent
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P i ∈ P is randomly chosen and allowed to alter his current action. All other players must
repeat their actions from the previous stage, i.e. a−i(t) = a−i(t−1). At stage t, the selected












for a fixed “temperature” parameter, τ > 0. As is well known for the Boltzmann dis-
tribution, for large τ , player i will select any action ai ∈ Ai with approximately equal
probability, whereas for diminishing τ , player i will select a best response to the action
profile a−i(t− 1), i.e.,
ai(t) ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai, a−i(t− 1))
with increasingly high probability.
The following theorem characterizes the limiting behavior associated with log-linear
learning for the class of potential games.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Blume, 1993 [11]). Let G be a finite n-player potential game. Log-linear
learning induces an aperiodic and irreducible process of the joint action set A. Further-












The explicit characterization of the stationary distribution in (2) reveals that as τ → 0,
all of the weight of the stationary distribution is on the set
{
a∗ ∈ A
∣∣ maxa∈A φ(a) = φ(a∗)},
i.e., the set of potential function maximizers.
2.3.3 Fictitious play
Fictitious play is one of well-known decision making rules in game theory. Roughly speak-
ing, a player with fictitious play assumes that other players are playing stationary strategies
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and estimates other players’ strategies using empirical frequency of other players actions
during the past time steps. Let a empirical frequency, qi(t) ∈ ∆(Ai), of P i be a running av-
erage of the actions of P i. In fictitious play, the strategy of P i at time t is the best response
to the other players empirical frequency, i.e.,
pi(t) = arg max
pi∈∆(Ai)
Ui(pi, q−i(t)).
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play (JSFP) [17], which is a variant of fictitious play, adds
notion of ‘fading memory’ and ‘inertia’ to fictitious play. Fading memory exponentially
discounts influence of past results, and inertia balances a probability to optimize its action
and willingness to maintain previous strategy. The reference [17] proved that for potential
games, if all players adhere to joint strategy fictitious play, then their joint action profile
converges almost surely to a pure Nash equilibrium of the game.
2.3.4 Regret testing
Regret testing is one of payoff-based learning rules introduced by [29]. Because it is a
payoff-based learning rule, an individual learning rule of regret testing depends only on
summary statistics of a player’s own realized payoffs. Suppose that each player P i has an
finite action set Ai. Assume that there are ‘hats’ that contain hi > |Ai| ‘tickets’ on which
the actions are written. A hat is a device for generating probability distributions over Ai,
and the player’s strategy can be described as selecting ‘a ticket’ within ‘a hat.’
Let G be a finite two-person game then a regret testing rule repeats the following pro-
cess. A period consists of s steps, where s is a large number. For each period, one hat
is selected as a player P i’s base strategy. Every time step during the period, he selects a
ticket from its current hat and takes the action written on the selected ticket. After playing
the action, the ticket is returned to the hat. At random time steps with probability ωi, a
player experiments a uniformly randomly chosen action instead of drawing a ticket from
the hat. Whenever a player plays an action, he receives a payoff. At the end of the period,
he calculates the average payoff ū for playing actions from the hat. And he also tallies the
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average payoff ūj for playing an experimented action aj ∈ A . For each action j, let the
estimated regret r̂j be a difference between ūj and ū, i.e.,
r̂j = ūj − ū.
In other words, r̂j is a statistical estimate of payoff loss for playing a strategy from the
hat instead of playing an action aj . If r̂j is greater than his tolerance level τi > 0 for at
least one action aj , then he chooses a new hat for the next period. Each hat has a positive
probability to be chosen when he choosing a new hat. Otherwise, he repeats the process
with his current hat during the next period.
This procedure is called a regret testing because of the logic behind it. If a player has a
significantly large amount of regret for at least one action, the player is not satisfied by his
current hat and chooses a new hat, i.e., a new strategy for the next period.
Let a joint strategy be an ε-Nash equilibrium of G if no player can increase his payoff
by more than ε through a unilateral change of strategy. Then the following theorem is
proven by [29].
Theorem 2.3.2 (Foster and Young, 2006 [29]). Let G be a finite two-person game played
by regret testers and let ε > 0. There are upper bounds on the tolerance τi and exploration
rate ωi, and lower bounds on hi and frequency of play s, such that, at all sufficiently
large times t, the players’ joint behavior at t constitutes an ε-Nash equilibrium of G with
probability at least 1− ε.
The regret testing rule is extended to the cases with more than two players in [31] . The
difference between the dynamics from [31] and the regret testing illustrated above is that
there is a small probability λi that a player P i selects a new action even if no experimented
action has a regret more than a tolerance τi. This ensures that there always some small
probability to experiment a new action for all players throughout the entire learning process.
Theorem 2.3.3 (Germano and Lugosi, 2007 [31]). Let G be a finite n-person game played
by regret testers and let ε > 0. There are upper bounds on the tolerance τi, exploration rate
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ωi and updating rate λi, and lower bounds on hi and frequency of play s, such that, at all
sufficiently large times t, the players’ joint behavior at t constitutes an ε-Nash equilibrium
of G with probability at least 1− ε.
In Chapter 4, this variant of regret testing learning rule from [31] is used to optimize
each elements of action sequences.
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CHAPTER 3
STOCHASTIC STABILITY IN DRIFTING ENVIRONMENTS
3.1 Introduction
A distributed adaptation rule may have multiple convergent outcomes. In assessing stochas-
tic stability, one analyzes a randomized perturbation of this rule. The effect of the random-
ization is to induce mixing among all possible steady state outcomes. However, as the
perturbation size is diminished, it may be that one outcome is favored among others in that
in the long run it occurs with increasing probability whereas other outcomes occur with
vanishingly small probability as the size of the randomized perturbation diminishes. In
other words, a stochastically stable outcome occupies almost all of the mass of an associ-
ated underlying stationary distribution.
Two standard references are [32, 20], which discuss equilibrium selection between risk
dominant or payoff dominant equilibrium in symmetric 2× 2 games. Their analysis exam-
ines a particular stochastic adaptation rule and establishes that risk dominant Nash equlibria
are stochastically stable over payoff dominant equilibria. Other utilizations of stochastic
stability include a simple model of language evolution [33], and emergent structures in
self-assembly [34].
This chapter investigates the robustness of stochastic stability1, i.e., how stochastically
stable states are affected by deviations from a nominal setup. A standard assumption in
game theoretic learning is a stationary environment, e.g., the game is fixed throughout the
entire process. We investigate the case of slow variations and show that, for sufficiently
slow time variations, the limiting behavior “tracks” the stochastically stable states.
Other papers also have examined robustness in game theoretic learning rules. These
works include modifications of log-linear learning [12], perturbations of so-called potential
games [36, 37], and variations on player selection and tie-breaking rules [38, 39].
1The results described in this chapter appear in [35]
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the main results regarding
robustness of stochastic stability. Section 3.3 specializes these results to learning in games,
and in particular, to binary log-linear learning. The results are applied to a sensor cov-
erage problem as an illustrative example in Section 3.4. Both simulations and laboratory
experiments illustrates the results for coverage games. Finally, the last section presents
concluding remarks.
3.2 Robustness of stochastic stability
Consider a perturbed stochastic system in the following form. Let Sn denote the set of
all n × n stochastic matrices. At each time step t = 0, 1, 2, ..., there exists a selection









∣∣ z(t)] = Pz(t)z(t+1)(t). (3)
In other words, there is a set of possible transition probabilities at each stage, and the
transition probabilities at stage t observe the Markov property with transition probabilities
determined by the specific selection P (t).
Now consider a stochastic matrix P ∗ ∈ Sn, and assume that P (t) is selected from a
neighborhood of P ∗. Or it can be interpreted as that P (t) is a linear system P ∗ with some
small noise, and ||P (t)−P ∗|| characterizes a size of the noise. Then the following theorem
proves a robustness of stochastic stability of the noisy process P (t).
Theorem 3.2.1 (Lim & Shamma, 2013 [35]). Let P ∗ ∈ Sn have a single aperiodic re-
current class, and let µ∗ ∈ ∆(n) be the associated stationary distribution over finite state









|Pr [z(t) = i]− µ∗i | < δ1, for all i ∈ Z.
Proof. Let the initial condition z(0) be selected according to the probability distribution
x(0) ∈ ∆(n), and define the switching linear system
x(t+ 1) = PT(t)x(t).
By construction, for any i ∈ Z and t = 0, 1, 2, ..., Pr [z(t) = i] = xi(t). Let W be an
n× (n− 1) matrix with orthonormal columns (i.e., WTW = I) that span the nullspace of
1T. Since x(t) evolves over the simplex, one can uniquely write
x(t) = µ∗ +Ww(t)
for some w(t) ∈ Rn−1. Define E(t) = P (t)− P ∗. Then the above linear iterations can be
written as
x(t+ 1) = PT(t)x(t)
= (P ∗T + ET(t))(µ∗ +Ww(t))
= P ∗Tµ∗ + ET(t)µ∗ + P ∗TWw(t) + ET(t)Ww(t).
Since µ∗ is a stationary distribution of P ∗, P ∗Tµ∗ = µ∗. Accordingly,







LetA = WTP ∗TW . Since P ∗ has a single aperiodic recurrent class, A is a stability matrix.
In particular, there exists a positive definite X = XT such that
ATXA−X < 0.
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Standard Lyapunov arguments establish that lim supt=0,1,2,... |w(t)| can be made arbitrarily
small, since diminishing δ2 implies diminishing ‖E(t)‖.
Note that the above theorem does not assume anything about the structure of the system
noise (P (t)−P ∗) except its maximum size. Theorem 3.2.1 can be combined with the notion
of stochastic stability.
Corollary 3.2.1 (Lim & Shamma, 2013 [35]). Let {Pε} be a regular perturbation of P 0,




‖P (t)− P ε‖ < δ2.
For any δ1 > 0, there exist ε > 0 and δ2 > 0 such that
lim sup
t=0,1,2,...
|Pr [z(t) = i]− µ∗i | < δ1.
Proof. Let µε be the stationary distribution for P ε. According to Theorem 3.2.1,
lim sup
t=0,1,2,...
|Pr [z(t) = i]− µε|
can be made arbitrarily small with diminishing δ2. Likewise, |µε − µ∗| can be made arbi-
trarily small with diminishing ε. Combining these two bounds proves the desired result.
Corollary 3.2.1 implies that if a state z is not a stochastically stable state then small
perturbations limit the long run probability to visit this state.
Now consider stochastic stability in a “drifting” process. Stochastically stability in
the process cannot be discussed in terms of a single stationary distribution because the
dynamic process is non-stationary. It was proven that the resulting dynamical system can
“track” drifting stochastically stable states if the drifting speed is sufficiently slow.
Theorem 3.2.2 (Lim & Shamma, 2013 [35]). Let Θ ⊂ Rm be a compact set. For each
θ ∈ Θ, let {P εθ} be a regular perturbation of P 0θ , and let µ∗θ be the associated distribution
characterizing stochastic stability. Furthermore, for each ε, let θ 7→ P εθ be continuous. Let
the dynamic process (3) satisfy
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• P (t) ∈
{
P εθ
∣∣ θ ∈ Θ}, and
• ‖P (t+ 1)− P (t)‖ < δ2.
For any δ1 > 0, there exist ε > 0 and δ2 > 0 such that
lim sup
t=0,1,2,...
∣∣Pr [z(t) = i]− µ∗θ(t)∣∣ ≤ δ1.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1, let the initial condition z(0) be selected according
to the probability distribution x(0) ∈ ∆(n), define the switching linear system
x(t+ 1) = PT(t)x(t),
and write
x(t) = µ∗θ(t) +Ww(t).
Then




Rewriting the above equation leads to
w(t+ 1) =WT(P εθ(t))








where µεθ(t) is the stationary distribution of P
ε
θ(t). From continuity of θ 7→ P εθ , the differ-
ence between stationary distributions
∣∣∣µεθ(t) − µεθ(t+1)∣∣∣ can be made arbitrarily small with
diminishing δ2 using continuity of stationary distributions with respect to transition proba-
bilities (see [40]). Likewise,
∣∣∣µεθ(t) − µ∗θ(t)∣∣∣ can be made arbitrarily small with diminishing
ε. Let A(θ(t)) = WT(P εθ(t))
TW . The resulting analysis resembles a slowly varying Linear
Parameter Varying (LPV) system (e.g., [41, 42, 43]) of the form
w(t+ 1) = A(θ(t))w(t) + f(t)
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where each A(θ(t)) is a stability matrix and |f(t)| is arbitrarily small. Standard arguments
regarding slowly varying systems lead to the desired result.
3.3 Specialization: Game Theoretic Learning
The analysis in the previous section is in terms of Markov processes, therefore it is applica-
ble to a variety of game theoretic learning rules. This section will apply robustness results
to a specific learning rule, binary log-linear learning [12], which is a variant of standard
log-linear learning [11].
Before explaining binary log-linear learning, we introduce the definition of constrained
action sets first. For many practical applications, a set of available actions for a player
at time t can be restricted by the player’s action at time (t − 1). For example, suppose
that an action ai is a mobile robot’s position. Then mobility constraints, such as velocity
limitations or physical obstacles, imply that the set of feasible position ai(t + 1) at time
(t + 1) is constrained by its current position ai(t). Define the set valued maps for every
P i ∈ P that characterize constrained action set by
Ci : Ai → 2Ai .
Then at each stage t = 0, 1, 2, ...,
ai(t) ∈ Ci(ai(t− 1)).
The following characteristics are assumed for constrained action sets.
• Feasibility : For any player P i ∈ P and any action pair ai(0), ai(m) ∈ Ai, there
exists a sequence of actions ai(0) → ai(1) → · · · → ai(m) satisfying ai(k) ∈
Ci(ai(k − 1)) for all k ∈ 1, 2, · · · ,m.
• Reversibility : For any player P i ∈ P and any action pair a′i, a′′i ∈ Ai, a′i ∈
Ci(a
′′
i )⇔ a′′i ∈ Ci(a′i).
24
Standard log-linear learning does not guarantee convergence to a potential function
maximizer when players’ action sets are constrained. However binary log-linear learning
solves this issue. Binary log-linear learning adapts players’ action as follows. At time t,
one player P i ∈ P is randomly selected and all other players should repeat their current
actions. The selected player P i chooses one trial action âi from its currently available
action set Ci(ai(t − 1)) uniformly. Then the player updates its action according to the





























paii (t) = 0, ∀ai 6= ai(t− 1), âi. (4c)
The player uses a Boltzmann distribution to randomly select between its previous action
ai(t− 1) and randomly selected trial action âi. It was proved by Marden and Shamma that
potential function maximizers being stochastically stable in binary log-linear learning.
Proposition 3.3.1 (Marden & Shamma, 2012 [12]). Let G be a finite n-player potential
game. Binary log-linear learning with perturbation parameter ε = e−1/τ defines a regular
perturbation of an associated limiting Markov chain. Let µ∗ be the associated distribution
characterizing stochastic stability. Then
µ∗(a) 6= 0⇔ a ∈ A∗.
Now our analysis about stochastic stability is applied to the learning rules. Consider
parameter dependent utility functions
Ui : A×Θ→ R
where Θ ⊂ Rm is compact. Assume that mapping θ 7→ Ui(a; θ) is continuous for all a ∈
A. Then parameter dependent versions of binary log-linear rules (4) can be defined. The
following two corollaries are direct consequences of the analysis in the previous section.
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Corollary 3.3.1 (Lim & Shamma, 2013 [35]). Suppose θo ∈ Θ results in a potential game.
Let µτθo be the stationary distribution of either log-linear learning or binary log-linear
learning. Then for every δ1 > 0, there exists a δ2 > 0 such that
|θ(t)− θo| < δ2
for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... implies that
lim sup
t=0,1,2,...
|Pr [a(t) = a]− µτa| < δ1
for all a ∈ A.
Corollary 3.3.2 (Lim & Shamma, 2013 [35]). Suppose that any θ ∈ Θ results in a potential
game with potential function φ(a; θ). Then for either log-linear learning or binary log-
linear learning, for every δ1 > 0, there exists a δ2 > 0 and τ > 0 such that
|θ(t+ 1)− θ(t)| < δ2










An implication of Corollary 3.3.2 is that the joint action a(t) plays the potential function
maximizer for current parameter θ(t) with high probability. Therefore a(t) “tracks” the
stochastically stable state.
So far, it was assumed that all players share the same values of θ(t). Now assume
that each player independently observes θ(t) with some bounded noise. Define θ̂i(t) as an




























paii (t) = 0, ∀ai 6= ai(t− 1), âi
Note that event density θ(t) is replaced to its noisy measurement θ̂i(t) from (4). The fol-
lowing corollary can be easily derived from Corollary 3.3.1 and Corollary 3.3.2.
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Corollary 3.3.3 (Lim & Shamma, 2013 [35]). Suppose that any θ ∈ Θ results in a potential
game with potential function φ(a, θ). Then for either log-linear learning or binary log-
linear learning, for every δ1 > 0, there exist δ2 > 0, δ3 > 0 and τ > 0 such that
|θ(t+ 1)− θ(t)| < δ2∣∣∣θ̂i(t)− θ(t)∣∣∣ < δ3










3.4 Example : Sensor coverage problem
As an illustrative example, this section presents a dynamic sensor coverage problem. Con-
sider a group of n mobile robots with limited sensor range trying to cover a finite mission
space S. Each robot i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} optimizes its position over S therefore action space
Ai = S for all i. Available actions at time (t + 1) for a robot i are its current section ai(t)
and adjacent sections including diagonal directions. Let θ(t) be a time variant event density
function θ(t) ∈ ∆(|S|) over the mission space S. It was assumed that |θ(t+ 1)− θ(t)| was
always bounded by some δ2 ≥ 0 for all t.
The global objective φ(a; θ(t)) at time t is a sum of event density over sections that is





where Ia : S → {0, 1} is an indicator function defined as Ia(sj) = 1 if sj is in the range of
at least one sensor under the joint action a, and Ia(sj) = 0 otherwise. Then define player’s
utility function as its marginal contribution to a global objective, i.e.
Ui(ai, a−i; θ(t)) = φ(ai, a−i; θ(t))− φ(a0i , a−i; θ(t)) (6)
where a0i is a null action which is equivalent to player i turning off its sensor. The utility
structure in (6) is called Wonderful Life Utility (WLU) [22], and it was proved that WLU
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Figure 3: Example of sensor allocation and event density over the mission space
constitutes a potential game [8] with the global objective φ as a potential function of the
game.
Mobile robots adopt binary log-linear learning with noisy theta measurement θ̂i from
the previous section. It was assumed that a size of measurement noise |θ(t) − θ̂i(t)| is
bounded by δ3. Figure 3 shows an example of optimal sensor allocation and event density
over the mission space. Each circle in the figure indicates coverage of a sensor.
3.4.1 Simulations
In the simulations, five mobile robots (n = 5) played binary log-linear learning over the
mission space S = {1, 2, ..., 30} × {1, 2, ..., 30}. Each robot has a finite sensor range of 3
unit length. The temperature parameter τ for learning algorithm was 0.005. Both static and
dynamic event densities were simulated with various noise levels.
In Fig. 4 (a), the event density distribution θ(t) was time-invariant. Since θ(t) = θ(0)
for all t, |θ(t + 1) − θ(t)| was always bounded by δ2 = 0. The three cases when a size of
randomly generated noise, |θ̂i(t)− θ(t)|, was bounded by δ3 = 0.0, 0.2 or 0.4 were tested.
As stated in Corollary 3.3.3, a joint strategy converged to a neighborhood of the potential
maximizer even under the presence of noise, and smaller δ3 yields more stable behavior. In
all cases, the players were maintaining the coverage successfully after the players they to
neighborhood of an optimal setting.
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Figure 4: Event coverage simulation results (a) static events (b) dynamically drifting events.
A size of randomly generated noise δ3 was bounded by 0.0,0.2, or 0.4 for both cases.
Now consider the case when event density is time variant. Fig. 4 (b) displays simulation
results with time-variant event density. In the simulations, the two centers of events moved
with a limited speed less than 0.03 per time step, therefore |θ(t + 1) − θ(t)| was bounded
for all t. The results of time-variant event coverage were less stable than the time-invariant
cases, but still a group of players could follow and cover the events. Although the results
of dynamic event cases were less stable than static event cases, the robots were able to
follow the moving events. The moving trajectories of drifting events and mobile robots
from t = 3500 to t = 4000 are illustrated in Figure 5. In the figure, the five mobile robots
could cover dynamically drifting events very well.
3.4.2 Laboratory experiments
3.4.2.1 Experimental system
A heuristic variant of log-linear learning was tested in an experimental setup with Khepera
III two-wheeled mobile robots [44] and OptiTrack motion capture system [45]. Figure 6
and Figure 72 shows the Khepera III robot and OptiTrack motion capture camera respec-
tively.
Khepera III is a mobile robot model developed by K-team corporation and the robot
2The image is taken from [45]
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time step = 3500
12 3
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Figure 5: Snapshots of a dynamic event coverage simulation at every 100 time steps from
t = 3500 to t = 4000.
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Figure 6: The Khepera III robot. The three small reflective balls are attached to the robot
for 3-dimensional position tracking by the OptiTrack system.
base uses the KoreBot computer board which is develepoed by the same manufacturer. The
size of each Khepera III is 130mm×70mm and its maximum running speed is 0.5m/s. The
KoreBot board features an embedded Linux operating system and standard compact flash
extension cards supporting WiFi and Bluetooth wireless communication. For experiments,
a 802.11b wireless network extension card is used, and an application program was devel-
oped using the application programming interface (API) provided by the manufacturer.
The OptiTrack motion capture system which is developed by NaturalPoint corporation
was used as a global positioning system (GPS) for mobile robots. The GPS lab setting
using motion tracking system is based on [46, 47]. Using the features of OptiTrack motion
cation capture system, real-time positions of the mobile robots are tracked and recorded by
a host computer of the experiment system.
The entire experiment system structure is demonstrated in Figure 8. A virtual event
density θ(t) over the mission space was generated by a host computer. As an indoor Global
Positioning System (GPS) for mobile robots, the motion capture system transmits to a
robot its current position and event density θj(t) for all section sj which is under coverage
of robot i. By this experimental setup, each mobile robot could adjust its position using
log-linear learning to maximize event coverage.
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Figure 7: The OptiTrack motion capture camera.
Figure 8: The structure of the experiment system
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Figure 9: Event coverage experiment results (a) static events (b) dynamically drifting events
3.4.2.2 Experiment results
For experiments, four robots (n = 4) were used, and the missions space S was discretized
into rectangular grid {−9,−8, ..., 0, ..., 8, 9}×{−9,−8, ..., 0, ..., 8, 9}. Each section sj ∈ S
was 0.2m × 0.2m, and each robot had a sensor coverage of radius 0.4m. The average
moving speed of the robots was 0.075m/s. For dynamic event experiments, the moving
speed of the center of event was 0.03m/s.
In the implemented variant of log-linear learning, a robot decided to stay at its current
section for two seconds with probability (1−ω) = 0.3, or to select new action amongCi(ai)
based on its strategy with probability ω = 0.7. Robots used the temperature parameter
τ = 0.0046 for the strategy. This heuristic variant was to include an additional incentive
for exploration.
Figure 9 presents experimental results for static and dynamic events. These results in-
dicate that robots could track the drifting distribution and the performance was comparable
to the static event case. During the experiment, there was no collision between robots even
though we did not consider any collision avoidance algorithm. The reason is that every
robot tried to minimize overlapped coverage region to maximize its utility which was its































Figure 10: Snapshots of a dynamic event coverage experiment at every 10 seconds from
130 seconds to 180 seconds
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close to each other. The moving trajectories of drifting events and mobile robots from 130
seconds to 180 seconds are shown in Figure 10.
3.5 Summary
We have examined the robustness of stochastic stability with unstructured noise or slowly
drifting environments. While the results were specialized to log-linear learning, the meth-
ods were derived for Markov chains and hence can be valid for a variety of settings. The
approach was applied in both simulation and laboratory experiments to distributed area





This chapter considers a problem of coordinating players without communications. The
specific model considered in this research is a team-based zero-sum game where a team of
agents wants to maximize the team’s reward against hostile opponents. The agents within
the team cannot communicate with each other, so they should independently optimize their
actions using local information. We will assume that players within the team do not know
the payoff structure of the game and cannot observe other players’ actions. Hence a learning
rule for the team players should be a payoff-based rule.1 There are two central concerns
in this work: i) learning correlated behavior with payoff-based dynamics and ii) rationality
level of opponents.
In general team-based zero-sum games, the team is not regarded as a single player
even though the team players have identical payoffs because the team members might not
be able to coordinate their actions. A team-maxmin equilibrium [48] is an equilibrium
of team-based zero-sum games in which coordination is not available. Given inability to
coordinate team players actions, the team-maxmin equilibria are equilibria of the game
with the highest payoff to the team. A team-maxmin strategy may not be unique but the
payoff of the team-maxmin equilibrium is unique.
If coordination between team members is available, the team’s payoff can be improved
beyond the team-maxmin equilibria. Coordination of players requires observation of a
common signal generated from an external device [49] or communication between players
[50]. A correlated equilibrium [49] which is a generalization of a Nash equilibrium is
an equilibrium of the game when full coordination is available. In a team-based zero-
sum game, opponents may be also able to observe and take advantage of information in
1For more information about payoff-based dynamics, refer to Chapter 2.
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the common signal or communications. The tradeoffs for the team between generation of
signals for future correlation and use of correlation for present payoffs is studied in [51].
Achieving correlated behavior without common signals or communication have been
studied by many works. One of the promising class of such learning rules is based on the
concept of regret such as [2, 52, 53, 54, 55]. Specifically, a recently discovered payoff-
based learning procedure of [56] is closely related to this research. In [56], players can
learn series of actions whose empirical distribution of play shows correlated behavior with
no explicit communications. The idea of optimizing a periodic action sequence instead of
adapting one-shot strategy is also adopted in our research. However the method described
in [56] does not assume the presence of opponents. Hostile opponents in a team-based
zero-sum game make learning correlated behavior trickier.
The opponent player in our team-based zero-sum game setting can observe the team
players actions and consequently he has more information than the team players. If the
opponent has perfect rationality and infinite memory, there always exist perfect strategies
for the opponent against periodic pure action sequences of the team players. Now assume
that the opponent player’s rationality is limited. Can the team players deceive the opponent
in spite of information asymmetry? To answer the question, a mathematical model of the
opponent’s rationality should be defined.
Behavior of players with limited rationality in repeated games has been studied in the
game theory literature. There is a rich set of research like [57, 58, 59, 60, 61] that adopts the
notion of finite automata to define the bounded rationality of agents. We adopt a bounded
recall strategy [62], which is a special class of automata, as the opponent’s rationality
model.
The contribution of this work is to demonstrate a payoff-based correlated behavior
learning under the presence of a hostile opponent. If the opponent has a specific form
of bounded rationality, then the team players’ periodic and deterministic action sequences
can achieve performance close to the correlated equilibrium. Since coordinating periodic
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and deterministic action sequences does not required common randomness, team players
can learn their action sequences without communications or public signals.
One of the problems with an action sequence learning is that the size of the game grows
exponentially as the length of the action sequence gets longer. We introduce a notion of
micro-players for an efficient sequence learning. By using de Bruijn sequences with the
micro-player approach, the size of game can be independent from the sequence length.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2, some important preliminary
concepts related to this research are introduced. Next, in Section 4.3, a team-based zero-
sum game is illustrated as a motivational example. In Section 4.4, a mathematical model
of an opponent player with limited rationality is defined, and we prove that there exist
optimal periodic sequences that look random from the opponent player’s point of view.
Section 4.5 introduces a notion of micro-players to learn a long action sequence efficiently
with no communications. Then two types of learning methods based on the micro-players
are proposed in Section 4.6 and Section 4.7. Lastly, in Section 4.8, we conclude with a
summary of the chapter and discussion about some limitations of the proposed methods.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Correlated equilibrium
The idea of correlated equilibria is that each player correlates its strategy to the same public
signal by assigning an action to every possible signal observation. If no player wants to
unilaterally deviate from its current strategy, the joint strategy is a correlated equilibrium.
Definition 4.2.1 (Aumann, 1974[49]). A joint strategy µ ∈ ∆(A) is a correlated equilib-
rium if for ∀i ∈ N , ∀ai ∈ Ai∑
(ai,a−i)∈A
µ(ai,a−i)(ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a′i, a−i)) ≥ 0
where µ(ai,a−i) is a probability of a joint action (ai, a−i) in the joint strategy µ.
Correlated equilibria have some useful properties. First, correlated equilibria can be
found in polynomial time for a succinct representation of a game [63]. And any convex
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combination of correlated equilibria is also a correlated equilibrium. Moreover, every Nash
equilibrium has a corresponding correlated equilibrium. Note that not every correlated
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, therefore a correlated equilibrium is a weaker notion
than a Nash equilibrium.
4.2.2 De Bruijn sequences
The definition of De Bruijn sequences [64] is as follows.
Definition 4.2.2 (De Bruijn, 1946[64]). A De Bruijn sequence is a cyclic sequences of a
given alphabet set A with size α for which every possible subsequence of length β in A
appears as a sequence of consecutive characters exactly once.
Let B(α, β) be the set of all De Bruijn sequences of order β from a symbol set A with
size α. For an example, one of possible De Bruijn sequences in B(2, 3) for a symbol set
A = {0, 1} is (00010111). Each De Bruijn sequence in B(α, β) has length αβ . For all α
and β, the size of the set of De Bruijn sequences is as follows.
|B(α, β)| = (k!)
αβ−1
αβ
A β-dimensional De Bruijn graph over α symbols is a directed graph whose vertices are
all available β-length tuples over α symbols. If one of the tuples can be built from another
tuple by shifting all its symbols by one place to the left and adding a new symbol at the end,
then the former tuple has a directed edge from the latter. Figure 11 shows a 3-dimentional
De Bruijn graph over a symbol set {0, 1}.
Every de Bruijn sequenceB(α, β) corresponds to a Eulerian cycle of a (β−1)-dimensional
De Bruijn graph or a Hamiltonian cycle of β-dimensional De Bruijn graph [65]. For
an example, consider a sequence (00010111) which is a De Bruijn sequence B(2, 3) for
A = {0, 1} again. Every tuple with length three occurs exactly once if every vertex of
Figure 11 is visited exactly once. Therefore one can build a De Bruijn sequence in B(α, β)
with arbitrary α and β using any algorithms finding Eulerian cycle over a given graph.
39
Figure 11: A 3-dimentional De Bruijn graph over a symbol set {0, 1}. Every Eulerian cycle
of the graph is an element of the de Bruijn sequence set B(2, 3).
In our work, a De Bruijn sequence is given to players during an initialization stage
before starting a game. For any arbitrary α and β, a de Bruijn sequence B(α, β) can be
constructed using established methods such as shifted registers [66, 67] or finite fields [68].
Discovering and analysing better methods to construct a de Bruijn sequence is an ongoing
research topic in combinatorics and cryptography [69, 70]. To create De Bruijn sequences,
one can utilize any methods including algorithms that are not listed here, and we will not
explicitly discuss how the sequence is generated in this thesis.
4.2.3 Information theory tools 2
Let X be a discrete random variable with a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(|X|). The





where p(x) is a probability of x in the distribution p. The entropy is a measure of uncer-
tainty in the random variable. By the convention, 0 log2 0 = 0.
2The contents on this subsection refers to [71].
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Let (X, Y ) be a couple of discrete random variables with a joint probability distribution












And the following chain rule of entropy can be easily verified.
H(X, Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X)
= H(Y ) +H(X|Y )
The mutual information of two discrete random variables X and Y is
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y ).
The mutual information I(X;Y ) means the reduction in the uncertainty of X due to the
knowledge of Y .
In analogy to conditional entropy, conditional mutual information can be defined. For
discrete random variables X , Y , and Z, the mutual information of X and Y given Z is
defined by
I(X;Y |Z) = H(X|Z) +H(Y |Z)−H(X, Y |Z).
4.3 Team-based zero-sum game
Consider a team based zero-sum game G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ) where φ :
X1 × X2 × Y → R is a reward for a team {P1X ,P2X}. If a joint strategy of the team
{P1X ,P2X} and the opponent player PY are given as µ and σ respectively, we will allow
abuse of notation by writing φ(µ, σ) as an average reward for the team. Denote actions for
P1X , P2X and PY as x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, and y ∈ Y respectively. Suppose that the action set
for each player is X1 = X2 = Y = {1, 2}. The team {P1X ,P2X} wants to maximize their











where P1X chooses rows, P2X chooses columns, and PY chooses matrices. If three players’
actions are the same then a reward for the team is 1. Otherwise the team gets 0 point.
If P1X and P2X independently mix their strategies, i.e., strategies of P1X and P2X are not
correlated, then the maxmin payoff for the team is 1
4
and a maxmin joint strategy µ∗ind ∈
∆(X1)×∆(X2) is














Now assume that there exist some secret signals between P1X and P2X so that full
correlation is achievable. Then the maxmin payoff is 1
2
and a maxmin joint strategy
µ∗cor ∈ ∆(X1 ×X2) is as follows.












In the cases when full correlation is available, the team can be considered as one player who
selects its action from (X1 × X2). However correlation tools such as communication or
public signals are not always available in many problem settings. Then how can the group
of players converge to a correlated equilibrium if any correlation tool is not available?
The main idea of this research is to build deterministic and periodic action sequences
that look random to opponents with limited rationality. Suppose that P1X and P2X play a de-
terministic and cyclic joint action sequence whose empirical frequency of a joint action is
equivalent to a correlated equilibrium. If there is no restriction on the opponent’s strategic
capability, it is obvious that an opponent can always win against the deterministic play-
ers. However agents in many practical applications have bounded rationality, and even a
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computer can be considered as boundedly rational because of its limited memory size or
processor speed. If the opponent player PY cannot recognize cyclic patterns longer than a
certain length, then a sufficiently long cyclic joint action sequence of the team may perform
as well as a sequence of i.i.d. random joint actions.
4.4 Opponents with limited rationality
This section defines bounded rationality of the opponent player and proves existence of
optimal periodic action sequences against the opponent. For this section only, we will con-
sider a team of players {P1X ,P2X} as one player PX . Then the game illustrated in the pre-
vious section becomes a repeated two player zero-sum game G = ({PX ,PY }, {X, Y }, φ)
where φ : X × Y → R is a reward for PX . Suppose that PX plays a L-periodic pure
action sequence x ∈ (X)L ⊂ XN where (X)L is the set of all L-periodic sequences from
X . Assume that PY plays a pure k-recall strategy σ :
⋃∞
n=0X
n → Y as follows.




n → Y satisfying ∀n > k, ∀x ∈ Xn
σ(x) = σ(xn−k+1, ..., xn)
Let Σk be the set of all pure k-recall strategies for PY and we will assume that k < L.
Note that a player with k-time step memory is able to play only bounded recall strategies
of order k or less.
For a given σ ∈ Σk, define p∗σ ∈ ∆(X) as the optimal strategy of PX that maximizes
an average reward when PX plays i.i.d. random actions, i.e.,
p∗σ = arg max
p∈∆(X)
φ(p, σ).
Then we want to find an action sequence x ∈ (X)L that looks i.i.d. random with distribu-
tion p∗ ∈ ∆(|X|) to observers with k or less memory.
Define x̂t as PX’s action observed by PY at time t, i.e., x̂t = xt+τ where τ is selected
uniformly random from {0, ..., L − 1}. Therefore the observed sequence (x̂1, x̂2, ...) is
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equivalent to τ -step shifted sequence x. Even though the original sequence x is determinis-
tic, x̂t is a random variable with distribution equivalent to an empirical frequency of x. Let
Pr [x̂t|x̂t−k, ..., x̂t−1] ∈ ∆(X) be a probability distribution of x̂t overX when x̂t−k, ..., x̂t−1
are given. Then we will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.1. Assume that a finite set X , a real number ε > 0 and a positive integer k
are given. There exists L that guarantees existence of L-periodic sequence x ∈ (X)L such
that for any t > k
‖p∗ −Pr [x̂t|x̂t−k, ..., x̂t−1]‖ < ε.
It can be interpreted as that any observer with k-memory cannot benefit from its mem-
ory about x̂t−1, ..., x̂t−k when it tries to predict PX’s action x̂t.
To prove the theorem, we will use De Bruijn sequences. If p∗ is a uniform distribution
overX , then De Bruijn sequences inB(|X|, k+1) satisfy the property stated in the theorem.
For examples, consider a De Bruijn sequence ‘00010111’ again. For a 2-memory observer,
this sequence looks uniformly random over {0, 1}. Assume that the observer observed ‘00’
during last two time steps. The empirical frequency of ‘000’ and ‘001’ is the same, so the
memory of the last two time steps is not helpful to predict the next action is whether ’0’ or
’1’.
Now consider the case with a more general p∗ rather than uniform distribution. Define
Qm ⊂ ∆(X) as the set of all available empirical frequencies of m-length sequence from


























Let p̂∗ = arg min
p∈Qm
‖p∗ − p‖ be the closest probability from p∗ in Qm. The larger the value
m is, the more precisely an arbitrary distribution p∗ can be approximated by p̂∗.
Consider a De Bruijn sequence sB ∈ B(m, k + 1) of a set A = {0, 1, ...,m− 1}. Then
one can define a mapping function π : A→ X such that for ∀j ∈ X
|π−1(j)| = mp̂∗j
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Define xB ∈ (X)mk+1 as a mk+1-periodic sequence canonically induced from sB by π.
Let w = (w1, w2, ..., wk+1) ∈
∏k+1
j=1 X be a (k+ 1)-length word of X , and EF(x,w) be















where x̂B is randomly shifted sequence xB. Note that ‖p∗ − p̂∗‖ can be made arbitrarily
small by selecting arbitrarily large m.
As an example, let k = 1, X = {A,B}, and p∗ = (2/3, 1/3) ∈ ∆(X). Let m = 3
then p̂∗ is equivalent to p∗ because p∗ ∈ Q3. Consider sB = 001021122 which is one
of De Bruijn sequence in B(m, k + 1) = B(3, 2). Now consider a mapping function
π : {0, 1, 2} → X such that π(0) = π(1) = A and π(2) = B. Then xB induced from sB is










Now apply the theorem to two player zero-sum games. Define Σk as the set of all k-
recall strategies for the second player. Then the following corollary is a direct consequence
of Theorem 4.4.1.
Corollary 4.4.1. Consider a two player zero-sum game G = 〈{PX ,PY }, {X, Y }, φ〉.
There exists a positive integer L such that, for any σ ∈ Σk and ε > 0, guarantees ex-
istence of x ∈ (X)L as follows.
max
p∈∆(X)






φ(xi, σ(xi−k, ..., xi−1))
Therefore if PX selects a period of its action sequence, L, large enough, then there
exists a sequence x ∈ (X)L that looks almost like the optimal one-shot strategy p∗ ∈ ∆(X)
from PY ’s point of view. The result proves the existence of effective joint periodic action
sequences against opponents with bounded rationality in team-based zero-sum games.
45
4.5 Micro-players within a team player
This section discusses how the team of players {P1X ,P2X} can coordinate periodic joint
action sequences without communications, and introduces a notion of micro-players. Con-
sider a team-based zero-sum game G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ) where φ : X1 ×
X2×Y → R is a reward for the team {P1X ,P2X}. LetX be a joint action setX1×X2. Each
P1X and P2X plays a L-periodic pure action sequence and PY plays k-recall strategy. Denote
periodic action sequences of P1X and P2X as x1 ∈ (X1)L and x2 ∈ (X2)L respectively. Let
x be a joint action sequence (x1, x2).
Assume that PY can observe all other players actions, but each P1X and P2X can only
observe its own action and reward. Any form of communication is not allowed between
team players, therefore P1X and P2X should optimize their action sequences using payoff-
based learnings. We will assume that PY ’s strategy σ is static for the rest of this chapter.
For a fixed opponent’s strategy σ ∈ Σk, a team based zero-sum game G can be considered
as an identical interest game G′ = ({P1X ,P2X}, {(X1)L, (X2)L}, φLσ ) between P1X and P2X .
The reward function φLσ : (X1)L × (X2)L → R is defined as
φLσ (x






Eφ(xt, σ(xt−k, ..., xt−1)) (7)
where xt = (x1t , x
2
t ). In other words, φ
L
σ is the team’s average reward for playing periodic
sequence x ∈ (X)L against the opponent’s strategy σ. Because identical interest games
are a special class of potential games, one can use any general payoff based learning for
potential games in which ‘actions’ are now replaced with ‘action sequences’.
The next question is how to learn and coordinate the optimal sequence. A straight-
forward approach is handling an action sequence as an action with a higher dimension.
Theoretically, there is no big difference between adapting ‘action sequences’ and adapting
‘actions’; ‘an action sequence’ can be treated as ‘an action with a higher dimension.’ In
a conventional repeated game setting, a process of general learning algorithms developed
for a single action learning are as follows; i) at every time step, a player i plays a selected
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action ai ∈ Ai, ii) observes the result and iii) updates its internal state. If a player wants to
learn a L-length action sequence with a general learning algorithm developed for a single
action learning, then the aforementioned process can be modified as follows; i) at every
L-time steps, a player i plays a selected L-length action sequence ai ∈ ALi , ii) observes the
result during the period and iii) updates its internal state at the end of the period. Hence
many existing game theoretic learning algorithms could be applied without drastic changes.
However learning a sequence of actions with payoff-based approach can be painfully
slower than the cases in which a player learns just a single action. In a single action learn-
ing, a number of action candidates is the size of the action set, i.e., |Ai|, and player can
test one action at a time. On the other hand, for a L-length action sequence learning, the
size of the candidate sequence set, i.e., |ALi | is exponentially increased, and it takes L-time
steps to test the result of the selected sequence. Generally the larger action set results in
the slower adapting speed in payoff-based learning because players often depend on their
‘luck’ to choose a trial action. For this reasons one can easily expect that this approach
might be too slow to be practical as the length L goes large.
For examples, suppose that a player P iX wants to optimize its action sequence xi ∈
(X i)L with length L = 5 over an action set X i = {0, 1}. Assume the player’s optimal
action sequence xi,∗ ∈ (X i)5 is all zero actions, i.e. repeating xi,∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0), and the
current action sequence is xi = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0). At the start of every new action sequence pe-
riod, with small probability ε, the player experiments a uniformly random action sequence.
Otherwise the player repeat his current action sequence with probability 1 − ε. Since the
number of action sequence candidates is 25, a probability that the player chooses xi,∗ by
luck is ε
25
. After choosing a trial sequence, five time steps are required to test the result of
the new action sequence. Even though only one element is mismatched between xi,∗ and
xi, it can take a very long time to correct it.
To alleviate this problem, this research introduces a notion of micro-players which are
virtual entities in actual players.Now go back to our team-based zero-sum game setting and
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suppose that bothP1X andP2X have the same number of micro-players. Every time step, one
micro-player in each player is chosen to play an action, observes the result and optimizes
its action independently. Suppose that P1X and P2X choose micro-players with the same
order. Then each micro-player in P1X always plays a game with a specific micro-player in
P2X , and vice versa. The notion of micro-player allows a player to replace its decision in
high dimensional space with multiple decisions in lower dimensions. Moreover the exact
matching between micro-players in different team players allows them to correlate their
actions.
Consider the previous example with the optimal sequence xi,∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and cur-
rent sequence xi = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) again. Now assume that there are five micro-players in
the player P iX and each micro-player is responsible for one element in the player’s action
sequence. Then the action sequence xi can be updated to x∗,i by adapting only one micro-
player’s action. In this idea, a proper utility function design for micro-players is required to
selectively update the micro-player who is responsible for a bad performance of the entire
sequence.
The formal setting for micro-player approach is as follows. Consider a team-based
zero-sum game G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ) where the opponent PY ’s strategy
is a static k-bounded recall σ ∈ Σk. Assume that each of the team players has m micro-
players. Let I be a set of ID numbers for micro players, i.e. I = {1, 2, ...,m}, and P i,jX be
j-th micro-player of P iX where j ∈ I. Define ξi : I → Xi as a function that maps a micro
player P i,jX to an action. For a given ID sequence s = (s1, s2, ..., sL) ∈ (I)L, let ξ1(s) (and
ξ2(s)) be a periodic sequence in (X1)L (and (X2)L) that is canonically induced from s by
ξ1 (and ξ2).
ξ1(s) = (ξ1(s1), ξ
1(s2), ..., ξ
1(sL)) ∈ (X1)L
ξ2(s) = (ξ2(s1), ξ
2(s2), ..., ξ
2(sL)) ∈ (X2)L
The notation ξ(sj) and ξ(s) will be used for a joint action (ξ1(sj), ξ2(sj)) and a joint se-
quence (ξ1(s), ξ2(s)) respectively. For convenience, we will allow any integer value for an
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index j when denoting a jth element sj in a periodic sequence s ∈ (S)I . Because s ∈ (S)L
is a periodic sequence, sj is equivalent to sj+L for every integer j ∈ Z. In the rest of this
chapter, we assume that the value of L, m and an ID sequence s ∈ (I)L is commonly
known by the team players P1X and P2X . Therefore coordinating the team players’ action
sequences is equivalent to coordinating ξ1 and ξ2.
The following two sections introduce payoff-based learnings for periodic sequence op-
timization using micro-players. In the first section, the number of micro-players is the same
as the period of action sequences, i.e., m = L. Hence each micro-player has one chance
to play an action during one period. However the number of micro-player is increased as
the action sequence’s period goes longer. The second section reduces the number of micro-
players so that the number of micro-player is much smaller than the sequence period, i.e.,
m < L. Each micro-player is allowed to play its action multiple times during one period
in this setup. It is shown that one can arbitrarily increase the period of action sequences
without adding more micro-players.
4.6 Micro-player matching
Suppose that m is equivalent to L. Let a ID sequence s ∈ (I)L be a periodic sequence such
that
s = (1, 2, ...,m− 1,m) ∈ (I)L = (I)m.







Eφ(ξi(h), ξ−i(h), σ(ξ(h− k), ..., ξ(h− 1))). (8)
Hence the micro-player P i,jX ’s utility Ui,j is an average of rewards for the next (1+k) steps.





Eφ(ξi(j), ξ−i(j), σ(ξ(j − k), ..., ξ(j − 1))) (9)
Note that maximizing average reward for the team {P1X ,P2X} is equivalent to maximizing
φLσ .
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Lemma 4.6.1. Let a utility for each micro-player is defined as (8). For a given opponent’s
strategy σ ∈ Σk, the team-based zero-sum game G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ)
can be transformed into a potential game of micro-players, Ĝ = ({P i,jX }, {Xi}, {Ui,j}) for
i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ I, and φLσ is a potential function of Ĝ.
Proof. Define ξi,j(s, a) as an action sequence such that the j-th element of ξi(s) is replaced
with a, i.e.,




= (ξi(1), ..., ξi(j − 1), a, ξi(j + 1), ..., ξi(m)).
In other words, P iX’s action sequence ξi(s) is changed to ξi,j(s, a) if its j-th micro-player
P i,jX changes its action from ξi(j) to a.
It is trivial to prove that Ui,j and φLσ satisfy the following for all i, j, σ and a ∈ Xi
Ui,j(ξ
i(s), ξ−i(s);σ)−Ui,j(ξi,j(s, a), ξ−i(s);σ)
= φLσ (ξ
i(s), ξ−i(s))− φLσ (ξi,j(s, a), ξ−i(s)). (10)
The equation (10) means that if P i,jX changes its current action ξi(j) and all other micro-
players in the team play with their current action mappings, then the change of Ui,j is
equivalent to the change of the potential function φLσ .
Because the game Ĝ is a potential game, we can use learning algorithms developed for
potential games. In this literature, there are several payoff-based learning algorithms that
guarantee potential function maximizers are stochastically stable. If all micro-players play
one of such algorithms then one can expect that a joint action sequence maximizing φLσ is
stochastically stable.
We will apply a variant of log-linear learning to adapt micro-players’ actions. The
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Ui,j(ξi,j(s, ā), ξ−i(s), σ))
(11)
where pa is a probability to play an action a ∈ Ai. However Ui,j(ξi,j(s, a), ξ−i(s), σ)
cannot be directly calculated in our problem settings because it requires knowledge about
the payoff structure and other micro-players’ actions.
Therefore micro-players try to estimate Ui,j(ξi,j(s, a), ξ−i(s), σ) instead of calculating
an exact value of it. Define r̂i,jt (a) as an estimated value of Ui,j(ξ
i,j
t (s, a), ξ
−i
t (s), σ). The











This section illustrates the detail of the learning algorithm with a simple ID sequence,
and proves that the resulting system can achieve performance that is close to one of the
optimal correlated joint strategies. The learning algorithm for a team player P iX is sep-
arated into two parts; an algorithm for an actual player P iX , and another algorithm for a
micro-player P i,jX . For convenience, the algorithms are described by pseudocodes based on
object-oriented design. The algorithmic flow of a repeated team-based zero-sum game G is
illustrated in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 are the algorithms for a player P iX
and its micro-player P i,jX respectively. Note that the pseudocodes in this section are writ-
ten to describe a sketchy flow of the algorithms, and these are not exhaustive descriptions.
Some trivial initialization arguments or minor parameters might be omitted here.
First, a repeated team-based zero-sum game G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ) are
illustrated in Algorithm 1. We will assume that the opponent’s rationality bound k and the
period of action sequence L, which is equivalent to the number of micro-players m, are
known to all team players. Therefore every team player has the same periodic ID sequence
3see Chapter 2
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Algorithm 1 A repeated team-based zero-sum game G
teamPlayer1 = new Player(rationalityBound,sequencePeriod) . declare P1X
teamPlayer2 = new Player(rationalityBound,sequencePeriod) . declare P2X
opponent = new Opponent(rationalityBound) . declare PY
t = 0 . time step t
while true do
t← t+ 1
x1 ← teamPlayer1.playAction() . each player chooses its action to play
x2 ← teamPlayer2.playAction()
y ← opponent.playAction()
r ← φ(x1, x2, y) . r is a realized reward
teamPlayer1.observeResult(r) . P iX cannot observe other players
teamPlayer2.observeResult(r)
opponent.observeResult(x1, x2, r) . PY can observe the team players’ actions
end while
s = (1, 2, ...,m). By Corollary 4.4.1, the value of m should be large enough to achieve a
performance that is arbitrarily close to the optimal correlated strategy. Every time step, all
players, P1X ,P2X and PY , in the game choose their actions x1, x2 and y, then a reward r
is determined as φ(x1, x2, y). The team players P1X and P2X cannot observe other players’
actions and any form of communication is not allowed. Hence the input argument for
observeResult() function of team players is only r. On the other hand, the opponent player
PY can observe the team players’ actions, and has three inputs x1, x2, r for observeResult()
function.
Next, let’s see the algorithm for a playerP iX described in Algorithm 2. Each team player




X } which is denoted as MicroPlayer[m]
in Algorithm 2. Whenever the player’s playAction() function is called, a micro-player who
will select an action for time t is determined by s(t), the tth element of the cyclic ID
sequence s. The corresponding micro-player MicroPlayer(s(t)) returns an action a as a
result of nextAction(). When the player receives the realized result r of the game through
observeResult(r), the reward r is passed on to the last k micro-players. Therefore, from
the individual micro-player’s point of view, each micro-player can receive the next (1 + k)
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Algorithm 2 algorithm for a player P iX
CLASS: Player
Attributes
t: current time step
Ai: an action set
k: the opponent’s rationality bound
m: a number of micro-players
s: a cyclic ID sequence






s← (1, 2, ...,m− 1,m)








for j = t− k + 1 to t
MicroPlayer(s(j)).updateReward(r)
end for
rewards after playing an action. Note that each micro-player requires (1 + k) consecutive
rewards to calculate its utility function Ui,j in (8).
Lastly, Algorithm 3 demonstrates how micro-players can learn and adapt its action.
Before starting learning, a micro-player P i,jX initializes r̂, which is an estimated rewards for
playing each action a ∈ Ai. When a specific micro-player is selected to play an action, the
selected micro-player repeats its current action ac with probability (1−ω) or experiments a
new action with probability ω. If it decides to experiment a new action, a trial action a ∈ Ai
is selected with the strategy (12). The selected action is returned to a player P iX . After
P iX plays an action, the micro player receives realized rewards through updateReward()
function during the next (k + 1) time steps. In updateReward(), two parameters c and h
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Algorithm 3 algorithm for a micro-player P i,jX
CLASS: MicroPlayer
Attributes
Ai: an action set
k: the opponent’s rationality bound
ω: an experiment rate
τ : a temperature parameter for learning
r̂[|Ai|]: a vector of estimated rewards for playing each action a ∈ Ai
h: sum of the last k reward history
c: reward counter
α: discount factor for reward estimation








if decide to experiment with probability ω


















if c = k + 1 . if (k + 1) rewards are received after the current action
r̂(ac)← (1− α) hk+1 + α · r̂(ac)
end if
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are updated to calculate its realized utility Ui,j in (8). The parameter c counts a number of
rewards after playing an action and h is a sum of those rewards. When (k + 1) rewards
are observed ,i.e., c = k + 1, then the utility estimation r̂i,j(ac) for its current action ac is
updated with discount factor α.
r̂i,j + t+ 1(ac)← (1− α)
h
k + 1
+ α · r̂i,jt (ac)
Then one can easily prove the following lemma regarding estimation error.
Lemma 4.6.2. Let r̂i,jt (a) be a micro-player P i,j’s estimated utility for playing a at time t.
If the micro-players’ experiment rate ω is small enough, then the error of utility estimation





t (s), σ)| < δ2
The following theorem proves that micro-player matching described above can achieve
correlated behavior.
Theorem 4.6.1. Let G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ) be a team-based zero-sum
game. Let the opponent player PY have a static k-recall strategy σ ∈ Σk. Let the team
players, P1X and P2X , coordinate their m-periodic action sequences with the micro-player
matching algorithm illustrated in this section. Suppose that the experiment rate ω is small
enough. Then, for sufficiently large time T and sequence length m, the average reward
for the team players’ periodic action sequences are arbitrarily close to performance of the
optimal correlated joint strategy, i.e.,
max
p∈∆(X1×X2)





where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small
Proof. Assume that m is large enough so that Corollary 4.4.1 guarantees existence of a
joint action sequence x = (x1, x2) ∈ (X1 ×X2)m such that, for some ε1 > 0,
max
p∈∆(X1×X2)
φ(p, σ)− ε1 < φmσ (x1, x2).
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Define (ξ1,∗(s), ξ2,∗(s)) as a joint action sequence of the team players that maximizing φmσ ,
i.e.,




Then the following is true.
max
p∈∆(X1×X2)
φ(p, σ)− ε1 < φmσ (ξ1,∗(s), ξ2,∗(s))
Lemma 4.6.1 proved that the game G can be transformed into a potential game of
micro-players Ĝ = ({P i,jX }, {Xi}, {Ui,j}) and φmσ is a potential function of Ĝ. If all micro-
players could play the original form of log-linear learning like (11), then the joint action
sequence (ξ1,∗(s), ξ2,∗(s)) is stochastically stable by [12].
However, as described in (12), micro-player matching employs estimated rewards r̂i,jt
instead of the utility Ui,j . Let P ε2 be the perturbed Markov process induced from the
original log-linear learning in (11) which is based on the exact value of utility. Similarly,
let P (t) be the perturbed Markov process induced from micro-player matching at time t.




‖P (t)− P ε2‖ < δ3.
Then the rest of proof is easily induced from Corollary 3.2.1.
4.6.2 Simulations
This section presents two examples to test micro-player matching and the simulation results
are shown.
4.6.2.1 Example 1
In this simulation, the action sets were X1 = X2 = Y = {0, 1} and the opponent player
PY ’s bounded recall strategy order had an order k = 2. The opponent’s action selection
rule did not depend on P2X’s action, and it was only conditioned on P1X’s action history
during previous k = 2 time steps as shown in Table 1. The action sequence period of the
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Table 1: Action selection rule for the opponent (PY )





Table 2: An example of the team’s optimal sequences.
x1(t) ... 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 ...
x2(t) ... 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 ...
y(t) ... 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 ...
φ(x1(t), x2(t), y(t)) ... 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...












Figure 12: Simulation result of sequence coordination example 1
team {P1X ,P2X} was L = m = 8. Then one of the team’s optimal action sequences that
maximizing average φ(x1(t), x2(t), y(t)) is 00110011 as Table 2, and the maximum average
reward for team players is 1. In the simulation, the probability to update an action sequence
was ω = 0.2 for both P1X and P2X . The exploration parameter 1τ for action selection (12)
was 4 .
Figure 12 illustrates a simulation result. The blue line is an average reward for the
team during last 300 time steps, and the red line is a ratio of mismatched elements between
sequences ofP1X andP2X . For an example, if the teams’ action sequences of length 8, x1 and
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(b) Payoff-based log-linear learning without introduc-
ing micro-players
Figure 13: Simulation results for learning speed comparison. The micro-player matching
could coordinate about five times faster than the case in which the team players played
payoff-based log-linear learning without introducing a notion of micro-players.
x2, are (00001111) and (00001100) respectively, then the mismatch ratio is 28 . Therefore if
every micro-player in the team players chooses the same action as its partner micro-player,
the mismatch ratio becomes 1.
The simulation result shows that ,after about 2100 time steps, P1X and P2X successfully
coordinated their action sequences and their average reward reached the maximum reward
1. Even after the successful coordination, micro-players within the team players sometimes
experimented random actions so that one can observe small noise in the mismatch ratio
graph.
Another simulation was conducted to compare learning speeds of the micro-player
matching and a general payoff-based learning in which an entire action sequence is treated
as one object. The payoff-based log-linear learning from [12] applied in this simulation is
a variant of original log-linear learning and its mechanism is very similar to the proposed
micro-player matching except the fact that a L-length action sequence is dealt as one ac-
tion. In the payoff-based log-linear learning, at every end of an action sequence period,
each team player P iX’s action sequence is selected among the set of L-length action se-
quences, (X i)L. The game settings including the opponent’s strategy for the simulation
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was the same as the previous simulation. All players have an action set {0, 1} and action
sequence period was L = 8.
Figure 13 (a) and (b) are the average rewards over time in the micro-player matching
and the payoff-based log-linear learning respectively. Note that the ranges ofX-axis for the
two simulation results in Figure 13 are different. While the micro-player matching could
converge to the optimal average reward after less than 3000 time steps, the payoff-based
log-linear learning took about 15,000 time steps until converging to the optimal average
reward. Therefore in this simulation, the team players could save about 80% of time for
coordinating their action sequences by introducing the micro-player concept.
4.6.2.2 Example 2
Let’s see another example. Suppose that action sets were X1 = X2 = Y = {0, 1}, and the
opponent player PY ’s strategy order was k = 3. The length of action sequences for P1X
and P2X was L = m = 16.
The opponent PY makes a decision using a fictitious play 4 with k time step memory.
Fictitious play is a class of the well-known learning algorithm based on empirical frequency












(x1(h) + x2(h)) < 0.5




(x1(h) + x2(h)) = 0.5, then
the opponent selects its action with uniformly random distribution. It can be interpreted
as that if one of actions among {0, 1} is more frequently selected by P1X and P2X , then the
opponent PY chooses the opposite action. Note that this PY ’s model with fictitious play is
a mixed k-recall strategy σ ∈ Σk.
This is a good example to compare the performance of coordinated joint action se-
quences with independently mixed strategies. Similar to the maxmin payoff comparison in
4see Chapter 2 for more details about a fictitious play.
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Figure 14: Simulation result of sequence coordination example 2
Section 4.3, if each P1X and P2X independently selects its one-shot strategy without com-








and its expected payoff is 1
4
. On the other hand, the expected payoff for the optimal corre-
lated strategy is 1
2






The simulation result is shown in Figure 14. The probability to update an action se-
quence was ω = 0.2 for both P1X and P2X . The discount factor α and exploration parameter
1
τ
were chosen as 0.5 and 4 respectively. The blue line is average rewards for the team
{P1X ,P2X}during last 300 time steps, and the red line is ratio of mismatched elements be-
tween the action sequences of P1X and P2X .
In the simulation results, the average reward is 0.58 which is close to the performance
of correlated strategies. Therefore the resulting joint action sequence of the micro-player
matching showed correlated behavior as the equivalent correlated joint strategies.
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4.7 Micro-player matching with a de Bruijn ID sequence
The previous section showed that the team players can coordinate their action sequences
using the concept of micro-players. However a number of micro-players, m, was the same
as a length of the action sequences, L, and one can easily expect that learning speed would
be impractically slow for a large number of micro-players. This section discusses how to
reduce the number of micro-players for long action sequences.
The micro-player matching described in the previous section assumed that the order
of micro-players is defined by a serial ID sequence s = (1, 2, ...,m − 1,m) ∈ (I)m.
Hence each micro-player plays an action once a period. Now assume that micro-players
are allowed to play an action more than once during a period. Then a number of micro-
players, can be less than a length of action sequence, i.e., m < L. However the order of
micro-players s ∈ (I)L cannot be any arbitrary sequence in this case. If s is not ‘complex’
enough, then its pattern will be recognized by opponents with bounded rationality.
For example, consider the illustrative team-based zero-sum game G from Section 4.3
again. Suppose that the opponent has 1-bounded recall strategy σ ∈ Σ1. Both the team
players P1X and P2X have two micro players, i.e., m = 2 so that the ID set of micro-player
is I = {1, 2}. Select a period of team players’ action sequences as L = 8. Assume that the
team players P1X and P2X coordinate a joint action sequence based on a given ID sequence
s ∈ (I)8 such that
s = (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2).










which is equivalent to the maxmin payoff for independently mixed joint strategy µ∗ind in Sec-
tion 4.3. The original purpose of introducing a micro-player is building an action sequence
whose average payoff is better than non-correlated strategy µ∗ind. But in this example, the
pattern of the sequence s is too simple to trick the opponent’s strategy σ and the average
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payoff is not improved from µ∗ind.
To solve the complexity issue, an ID sequence s will be selected from de Bruijn se-
quences 5 which is a special class of periodic sequences. Consider s ∈ B(m, k + 1) ⊂
(I)mk+1 , which is a de Bruijn sequence of a symbol set I with order (k + 1). Then the
period length of an action sequence xi for P iX is mk+1, i.e.,
xi = ξi(s) = (ξi(s1), ξ
i(s2), ..., ξ
i(smk+1)) ∈ (X i)mk+1 .
Suppose thatP1X andP2X share the same de Bruijn sequence s ∈ B(m, k+1). Then the joint






= Pr [ξ(st̂)] . (13)
In other words, the last k-steps history does not give any information about the probability
of the team players’ next joint action Pr [ξ(st)], and such de Bruijn sequences cannot be
recognized by k-bounded recall strategies. Therefore it looks a jointly random action from
the opponent’s point of view.
Now, we will redefine micro-players’ utility function Ui,j for this de Bruijn ID sequence
approach. Let ξi(I) be a joint action profile of micro-players within a player P i. For every




X2)× Σk → R for a micro-player P i,j is
Ui,j(ξ






φ(ξi(j), ξ−i(j), σ(ξ(λ))) (14)
where ξ(λ) is a k-length joint action sequence induced from a k-length ID word λ ∈∏k
h=1 I. Note that the utility function (14) can be interpreted as an average reward for
jth micro-player’s play. As long as the ID sequence s is a de Bruijn sequence, the utility
function is independent from a selection of s because of the characteristic of de Bruijn se-
quences; all available k-length history of micro-player ID happens exactly once during a
period from each micro-player’s point of view.
5See Definition 4.2.2
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Then it can be easily verified that, for a given static opponent’s strategy σ ∈ Σk, the
team’s average reward φLσ in (9) is a sum of each micro-players utility Ui,j . For ∀i ∈ {1, 2}







where the sequence length L is mk+1.
However Theorem 4.6.1 no longer holds for this de Bruijn ID sequence approach. In
micro-player matching with a serial ID sequence in the previous section, the utility func-
tion Ui,j defined as (8) satisfies the equation (10). Accordingly the resulting game could
be converted to a potential game as proved in Lemma 4.6.1. On the other hand, the rede-
fined utility (14) cannot satisfy the equation (10), and thus learning algorithms for potential
games cannot be applied in this section. The learning algorithm for a de Bruijn ID sequence
approach will be illustrated after discussing the phase difference issue of this method.
Lemma 4.7.1. Consider a team-based zero-sum game G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ).
Suppose that the team players play the micro-player matching with de Bruijn ID sequence.
Let a utility for each micro-player is defined as (14). For a given opponent’s strategy
σ ∈ Σk, the team-based zero-sum game G can be transformed into a normal form game of
micro-players, Ĝ = ({P i,jX }, {Xi}, {Ui,j}) for i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ I.
A significant advantage of the de Bruijn ID sequence approach is that the size of the
game is independent from the rationality level of opponents. The size of the game in
micro-player matching method is increased as the number of micro-players goes larger. In
the previous section, the larger opponent’s rationality level k requires the longer length of
simple ID sequence s = (1, 2, ...,m − 1,m) which is equivalent to the number of micro-
players . On the other hand, a de Bruijn ID sequence s ∈ B(m, k+1) can be constructed for
any arbitrary positive integer k, and the value of k is independent from m. Consequently,
the team players does not have to increase their number of micro-players to coordinate their
behavior against smarter opponents with a larger rationality level.
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4.7.1 Phase difference between action sequences
Even though complexity issue could be alleviated with de Bruijn sequences, the micro-
player matching with a reduced number of micro-players has another problem; phase dif-
ference between team players. A phase difference between team players can damage the
team’s payoff for two reasons.
First, joint action sequences with phase difference can be predicted by opponents even
with bounded rationality. Note that opponents with limited rationality can take advan-
tage from its observation if the team players’ action sequences do not satisfy (13). With
the same de Bruijn ID sequence s ∈ B(m, k + 1), if the team players’ action sequences
x1 ∈ (X1)mk+1 and x2 ∈ (X2)mk+1 are repeated without any phase difference, the joint
sequence (x1(t), x2(t)) cannot be recognized by the opponent. However if there exists
phase difference, the resulting joint action sequence does not hold (13) and k-step history
provides information about the team’s next action.
Secondly, phase difference hinders correlation between micro-players. Without phase
difference, a micro-player P i,jX can correlates its action with its ‘game partner’ P
−i,j
X be-
cause each micro-player has a fixed partner within another team player, i.e., ith micro-
player in P1X always plays a game with ith micro-player in P2X . However P
i,j
X does not
have a fixed partner if there exists a phase difference between players’ action sequences.
For examples, consider the de Bruijn ID sequence of an ID set I = {1, 2}
s = (1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2) ∈ B(2, 3).
Assume that P1X plays one-step lagged action relative to P2X , then the resulted joint se-
quence is as follows.
P1X’s action ... ξ1(1) ξ1(1) ξ1(1) ξ1(2) ξ1(1) ξ1(2) ξ1(2) ξ1(2) ...
P2X’s action ... ξ2(1) ξ2(1) ξ2(2) ξ2(1) ξ2(2) ξ2(2) ξ2(2) ξ2(1) ...




X with the same empirical frequency.
If a micro-player P i,jX ’s partner is not fixed to a specific micro-player P
−i,j
X , then periodic
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action sequence approach loses its merit relative to independently mixed action strategies.
Therefore a proper phase-lock process is needed for the micro-player matching with a de
Bruijn ID sequence.
Before discussing a phase-lock process, we will define a notation regarding a circular
shift of a periodic sequence. Define ssh(α) as a circular shift of a periodic sequence s ∈ (I)L.
For an example, consider a periodic sequence s = (1, 2, 3, 4) then ssh(α) is as follows.
ssh(2) ... 3 4 1 2 ...
ssh(1) ... 4 1 2 3 ...
ssh(0) = s ... 1 2 3 4 ...
ssh(−1) ... 2 3 4 1 ...
ssh(−2) ... 3 4 1 2 ...
In other words, a circular shift ssh(α) is a lagging sequence if α is a positive number, and a
leading sequence if α is a negative number.
Consider a periodic sequences s′ which is a circular shift of a periodic sequence s ∈
(I)L. Since s is a cyclic sequence, one can express s′ as either a lagging sequence or a
leading sequence comparing to s. If s′ is expressed as an α-step lagging sequence, ssh(α),
then it can be also expressed as a (α−L)-step leading sequence, ssh(α−L). For convenience,
we will denote the circular shift sequence s′ as ssh(j) if |j| < |j − L| or ssh(j−L) otherwise.
Now assume that s is a de Bruijn sequence and consider the micro-player matching with
de Bruijn sequence s again. Without loss of generality, if there is phase difference, let the
lagged player among the two team players is P1X and the leading player is P2X . Therefore,
for a given micro-player ID sequence s, the team players’ action at time t can be expressed
as follows.
x1(t) = ξ1(s(t))
x2(t) = ξ2(ssh(−α)(t)) (16)
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And one can assume that α is always non-negative value because x2 is a leading sequence.
Define hk(t) ∈ Ik be the k-length history of ID sequence s at time t, i.e,
hk(t) = (s(t− k), s(t− k + 1), ..., s(t− 1))
= (ssh(k)(t), ssh(k−1), ..., ssh(1)(t)) (17)
Note that k-step history of a sequence s(t) ∈ I at time t can be expressed as a joint of
lagging sequences. Then the opponent PY ’s k-recall strategy σ is
σ(ξ1(hk(t)), ξ
2(hk(t+ α))) = σ(ξ
1(hk(t)), ξ
2(hk(t+ α))) (18)
where the team players’ k-step action histories ξ1(h(t)) and ξ2(h(t + α)) are defined as
follows.
ξ1(hk(t)) = ξ
1(ssh(k)(t), ssh(k−1)(t), ..., ssh(1)(t))
ξ2(hk(t+ α)) = ξ
2(ssh(k−α)(t), ssh(k−1−α)(t), ..., ssh(1−α)(t)) (19)
The main idea for phase difference detection is that P1X’s realized rewards r(t) =
φ(x1(t), x2(t), y(t)) is somehow associated with some leading ID sequence ssh(−α) if and
only if P2X’s sequence is leading: in the equations (16), (18) and (19), a shifted sequence
ssh(j) with negative value j appears if and only if P2X’s sequence is leading. On the other
hand, the team players’ action histories (19) are related to a joint of lagging sequences re-
gardless the existence of phase difference. Hence a reward sequence is always associated
with the lagging sequence, and the leading player cannot determine whether there exists a
lagging player by observing correlation between r(t) and any lagging sequence ssh(j). But
the lagging player can observe correlation between leading sequences and the reward se-
quence when α 6= 0. Therefore lagging player can determine whether he is lagged behind
his team player or not. If a player observes strong correlation between ssh(−α)(t) and r(t),
it skips α steps from its current ID sequence to align with its leading team player.
To apply the method described above, a proper metric is required to measure the corre-
lation between a reward sequence and shifted ID sequences. Note that we cannot assume
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linear property on the reward function φ(x1, x2, y), and the players’ actions can be nominal
values. Consequently most of conventional correlation coefficient for real valued data, such
as Pearson’s correlation coefficient, cannot be used as a measure for our method. In this
research, the uncertainty coefficient [72] will be used as a metric that measures correla-
tion between sequences. The uncertainty coefficient is based on entropy from information
theory literature and can be calculated for nominal data.
Definition 4.7.1 (Theil, 1970 [72]). Consider two discrete random variables A and B. The







U(B|A) is a normalized mutual information I(A;B). By the definition, a value of
U(B|A) lies between 0 and 1. Note that the uncertainty coefficient is not symmetric, i.e.,
U(B|A) 6= U(A|B). The uncertainty coefficient U(B|A) gives the fraction of uncertainty
of B that is lost if A is already known. If U = 0, A and B are independent. If U = 1, B
is completely predictable by A. For in-between values, one should cautiously interpret the
uncertainty coefficient. For examples, suppose that the value of U(B|A) is 0.3 for some
random variables A and B. Are these two variables A and B associated or not? There is no
general threshold regarding U(B|A) that guarantees whether the variables are associated or
not. In micro-player matching, this threshold is heuristically chosen according to the given
game. The detail of phase-lock process is illustrated in the next section.
4.7.2 Algorithm description
This section illustrates algorithmic details of the micro-player matching with a de Bruijn
ID sequence. There are two major concerns in the algorithm; a phase-lock process and
sequence optimization. An individual player performs phase-lock process every end of its
action sequence period using uncertainty coefficient. For sequence optimization, the regret
testing rule [29] is applied to each micro-player.
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Before discussing detail of the algorithm, we will put a few assumptions on the system.
First, each P1X and P2X has its own independent time clock. This clock shows the flow of
discrete time step t and both players choose their actions ξi(st) based on their individual
time clocks. Second, all players’ time clocks start at the same time with the same initial
value t0 = 0, so there is no phase difference in normal cases. Lastly, every time tick, there
exists very small probability ε that the clocks fails to increase t due to some external factors.
If P1X fails to increase its time clock then his phase lagged one-step behind comparing to
P2X and vice versa. With this mechanism, the team players’ phase difference varies slowly
and phase difference cannot be increased or decreased more than one during one time step.
Therefore if the team players can align their phases properly then the phase difference
would not be a large number. In our algorithm, it is assumed that the amount of phase
difference α between team players is maintained less than some small value ᾱ.
Similar to Section 4.6.1, object-oriented pseudocodes are written to describe the micro-
player matching with de Bruijn sequence. The algorithmic flow of a repeated team-based
zero-sum game G is omitted here since it is identical to Algorithm 1. The algorithms for a
player P iX and its micro-player P
i,j
X are Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5 respectively.
The player P iX’s algorithm in Algorithm 4 is similar to Algorithm 2 from the previous
section except the part related to a phase-lock process. Using the uncertainty coefficient,
the phase-lock process for the micro-player matching is as follows. At every end of its
action sequence period, phaseDifferenceCheck() function is called. Then the team player
P iX tests the uncertainty correlation




between r, the observed reward samples during the period and ssh(−j), leading ID se-
quences for j ∈ {1, ..., ᾱ}. For entropy calculation, probability densities are calculated
from observed samples during the last one period of action sequences (i.e. mk+1-steps). If
U(r|ssh(−j)) is larger than a heuristically chosen threshold ū then we think that r and ssh(−j)
are associated. In Algorithm 4, ᾱ and ū are selected as 1 and 0.15 respectively, thus it test
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Algorithm 4 algorithm for a player P iX
CLASS: Player
Attributes
t: current time step
Ai: an action set
k: the opponent’s rationality bound
m: a number of micro-players
s: a De Bruijn ID sequence B(m, k + 1)
ū: a uncertainty coefficient threshold






s← B(m, k + 1)








for j = t− k + 1 to t
MicroPlayer(s(j)).updateReward(r)
end for
if t mod L == 0 . if it is the end of current period
for j = t− k + 1 to t
MicroPlayer(s(j)).updateAction() . perform regret testing
end for
α=phaseDifferenceCheck() . check phase difference











whether U(r|ssh(−1)) is larger than 0.15 or not.
However the entropy H(r) should be larger than a certain amount to test ‘meaningful
correlation’ between s and r. For examples, consider a team of two players with the micro-
player matching and assume that there is no phase difference between the two players.
Suppose that all micro-players in both team players could not coordinate their actions so
that the observed reward r(t) are all zeros. The empirical entropy of r(t) is H(r) = 0 and
consequently, I(r; ssh(j)) is also zero for any j. Therefore there is a condition H(r) > 0.1
in phaseDifferenceCheck().
Algorithm 5 illustrates a micro-player P i,jX ’s mechanism which is a variant of regret
testing [29, 31]6. During initialization stage, parameters r̂ and c which are related to av-
erage rewards calculation are reset and a base action ab is randomly selected among Ai.
Whenever the specific micro-player P i,jX is selected to play an action for P iX , the micro-
player has two options. With a small experiment probability ω, the current action ac is
selected uniformly random, or ac is its base action ab with a probability (1− ω). Then the
realized reward r is passed on to the micro-player through UpdateReward(r). To calculate
the average of realized rewards for each action, the counter c(ac) is increased by one and
the reward r is added to r̂(ac).
If it is the end of sequence period, UpdateAction() functions of all micro-player are
called, and each micro-player updates its base action as follows. First, it calculates baseRe-
ward which is an average reward for playing the base action ab during the last period. Then
compare it with regret(a) which is a difference between baseReward and an average reward
of an action a ∈ Ai \ ab. If regret(a) is larger than a tolerance level τ then a is a candidate
for a new base action selection. If there is at least one candidate action, the new base action
6See Chapter 2 for more detail about regret testing rules.
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Algorithm 5 algorithm for a micro-player P i,jX
CLASS: MicroPlayer
Attributes
Ai: an action set
ω: a rate to experiment an action other than ab
β: a temperature parameter for learning
τ : tolerance level
λ: a rate to update ab even there is no action with large regret
r̂[|Ai|]: sum of rewards for playing a ∈ Ai
c[|Ai|]: counter for playing a ∈ Ai
ac ∈ Ai: a current action
ab ∈ Ai: a base action
Methods
MicroPlayer.Initialization()
r̂(a)← 0 for all a ∈ Ai
c(a)← 0 for all a ∈ Ai
ab ← rand(Ai) . select a random base action ab
ac = MicroPlayer.NextAction()
if decide to experiment with a probability ω
ac ← rand(Ai) . select a uniformly random action ac
else




c(ac)← c(ac) + 1




. average reward for the base action ab
for each a ∈ Ai\ab
regret(a)← r̂(a)
c(a)
−baseReward . regret for not playing a
if regret(a) > τ





r̂(a)← 0 for all a ∈ Ai . reset parameters for the next period
c(a)← 0 for all a ∈ Ai
if at least one pa is non-zero
select ab with a normalized probability vector pa
else
with a probability λ, select a uniformly random ab
otherwise, keep the current ab
end if
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, if regret(a)> τ
pa = 0, otherwise (21)
where D is a normalization factor and β is a temperature parameter for learining. If
regret(a) for every action a ∈ Ai \ ab is smaller than τ then the micro-player selects a
uniformly random base action ab with a small probability λ or repeat the current base ac-
tion ab with a probability (1− λ).
The following theorem is the direct consequence of Lemma 4.7.1 and Theorem 2.3.3.
Theorem 4.7.1. Let G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ) be a team-based zero-sum
game. Suppose that the opponent player PY have a static bounded recall strategy σ ∈ Σk.
Let the team playersP1X andP2X coordinate their periodic action sequences with the micro-
player matching algorithm with a de Bruijn ID sequence s ∈ B(m, k + 1) ⊂ (I)mk+1 .
There are upper bounds on the parameters ω, λ and τ , and lower bounds on k, such that,
for all sufficiently large times t, the team-players’ joint behavior at t constitutes an ε-Nash
equilibrium of the equivalent game Ĝ with probability at least 1− ε.
Note that an ε-Nash equilibrium are not necessarily the optimal equilibrium of the game
Ĝ.
4.7.3 Simulations
This section presents simulation results of the micro-player matching with a de Bruijn ID
sequence. Consider a team-based zero-sum game G. In the simulation, the action sets
were X1 = X2 = Y = {1, 2, 3}. Each of the team players P1X and P2X had m = 3
micro-players, and the opponent PY had a static bounded recall strategy with an order
k = 5. The micro-player ID sequence s was selected from the set of de Bruijn sequences
B(m, k+ 1). Therefore a period of action sequence was L = mk+1 = 36 = 729. Similar to
the illustrative example in Section 4.3, the team players’ payoff function φ : X1×X2×Y →
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R is as follows. As shown in Table 3, if x1 = x2 = y then φ(x1, x2, y) is 1, and otherwise
φ(x1, x2, y) is 0.




1 1 0 0
2 0 0 0





1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0





1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 1
y =3
The opponent PY ’s k-recall strategy σ ∈ Σk was as follows. Every time step, the
opponent PY selected an action y ∈ Y that has the least empirical frequency in the last
k-length history of team players’ actions. If there exist more than one action with the
least empirical frequency, one action among them was selected uniformly random. For
examples, if k = 5 and the last 5-length action histories of x1 and x2 are ‘12213’ and
‘23211’ respectively, then PY selects 3 as his action.
One can easily prove that, for the aforementioned opponent’s strategy σ, the optimal
one-shot correlated joint strategy µ∗cor ∈ ∆(X1×X2) for the team is a uniform distribution
over the three joint actions {(1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)}. Then the expected reward for µ∗cor is
max
µ∈∆(X1×X2)




Therefore the average rewards in the simulations will be compared with 1
3
.
Note that, in Theorem 4.7.1, the team-player’s joint behavior converges to a neighbor-
hood of Nash equilibrium of the equivalent normal form game Ĝ = ({P i,jX }, {Xi}, {Ui,j}).
The following claim proves that an optimal joint action profile for micro-players is a Nash
equilibrium.
Claim 4.7.1. In the setup for simulations, every optimal joint action profile of micro-players
is a Nash equilibrium of the game Ĝ.
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Figure 15: Simulation result of micro-player matching with a de Bruijn sequence. The
upper graph shows the average reward and the lower one shows the phase difference α.
The positive value of α means that P1X is lagging, and a negative value means that P2X is
lagging. And α is zero when there is no phase difference between P1X and P2X .
Proof. Every optimal joint action sequence of the team players with m = 3 micro-players
is one of de Bruijn sequences B(m, k + 1) over the joint action set {(1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)}.
Consequently, each pair of micro-players (P1,jX ,P
2,j
X ) should coordinate their joint action to
one of the joint action set {(1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)}, and it should not be overlapped with other
pair of micro-players. It is obvious that any unilateral deviation from such joint action
profiles will damage the deviating micro-player’s utility Ui,j .
Figure 15 shows the simulation result. The upper graph in Figure 15 shows the average
reward during the last L = 729 steps and the dotted line at 1
3
is drawn for comparison
purpose. The lower graph indicates a value of phase difference α between the team players
ID sequences. The positive value of α means that P1X is lagging, and a negative value
means that P2X is lagging. And α is zero when there is no phase difference between P1X
and P2X . In the simulation, the parameters are set as ω = 0.1, λ = 0.01, τ = 0.15, and
β = 25.
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To test the phase lock process, the index of ID sequence s in a team player was artifi-
cially lagged by one at time t = 14580 and t = 29169 during the simulation. As shown
in the second graph in Figure 15, artificially inserted phase differences were properly cor-
rected in the simulation.
Furthermore, the average reward reached almost 1
3
which is the expected reward for µ∗cor.
When there existed phase difference, the average reward went down but it was recovered
soon after the team players’ phases are locked again. Note that the average reward was little
bit less than 1
3
even though team players coordinated their action sequences. The reason is
that micro-players experimented trial actions with probability w even after they optimized
their actions. Therefore one can conclude that micro-player matching with a de Bruijn
sequence could performed well as much as correlated one-shot strategies.
4.8 Summary and discussion
4.8.1 Summary
The goal of this chapter was to coordinate team players’ actions without any communi-
cations in team-based zero-sum games. Generally, some global signalling devices are re-
quired for common randomness between players, but communications are very limited or
impossible in many practical applications. Instead of learning a one-shot strategy, we let
players coordinate a periodic sequence of deterministic actions and put an assumption on
opponent’s rationality. Since team players’ action sequences are periodic and deterministic,
common randomness is no more required to coordinate players. And it is proved that if a
length of a periodic action sequence is long enough, then opponents with limited rationality
cannot recognize its pattern. Because the opponents cannot recognize that the players are
playing deterministic actions, the players’ behavior looks like a correlated and randomized
joint strategy with empirical distribution of their action sequences. Consequently players
can coordinate their action sequences without any communication or global signals, and the
average rewards of the resulted action sequences are as good as correlated joint strategies.
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The notion of micro-players are introduced for efficient learning of long action se-
quences. By introducing a concept of micro-players, a problem of optimizing a parameter
in a higher dimension is converted into an optimization of multiple parameters in a smaller
dimension. In the first type of micro-player matching, a group of m micro-players within a
player plays actions with a serial order ID sequence s = (1, 2, ...,m).
In another micro-player matching method, in which a de Bruijn sequence is adopted
as a ID sequence, players can generate very long action sequences without increasing the
number of micro-players. The number of micro-players in this method can be independent
from rationality level of the opponents. To correct phase difference between team players’
action sequences, the uncertainty coefficients of realized rewards and shifted ID sequences
are measured. The simulation results are shown to demonstrate the performance of micro-
player matching methods.
4.8.2 Discussion
The proposed methods are constructed upon an important assumption that the team-players
time steps are synchronized. We stated that micro-player matching does not require explicit
global signals and communications between team players, but one might view ‘time steps’
in our methods as the common signal to which the players could correlate their actions.
Even though the assumption on synchronized time steps is a little bit relaxed by considering
small phase differences between the team-players, if time steps for each team player in the
system is not synchronized well then our methods cannot be applied.
In the de Bruijn ID sequence approach, the uncertainty coefficients were tested as a
phase difference detection. The uncertainty coefficients could measure a level of associ-
ation between realized rewards and shifted ID sequences ssh(−j) with some small value j,
because we assumed that phase difference rarely happened in the system. However exact
limitation of the uncertainty coefficient as an association measurement is not completely
analyzed yet.
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Also the de Bruijn ID sequence approach has an optimality issue. In the first micro-
player matching method with a serial order ID sequence, the original team-based zero-sum
game can be converted to a potential game between the team players for a static opponent’s
strategy. Potential games are the special type of games in which the potential function
maximizer is a Nash equilibrium and better-reply dynamics can reach the potential func-
tion maximizer. Consequently, existing learning algorithms for potential games, which
are based on better-reply dynamics, can guarantee the convergence to the neighborhood of
the optimal point. On the other hand, in the de Bruijn ID sequence approach, the team-
based zero-sum game is converted to a normal form game between the team players. Since
Theorem 2.3.3 showed that a regret testing rule converges to neighborhood of a Nash equi-
librium of general finite normal form games, it can be applied as a learning algorithm for
micro-players. However a Nash equilibrium of the game is not necessarily an optimal point,
and thus the resulted behavior of micro-player matching with de Bruijn ID sequence may
not be optimal. For better results, a proper equilibrium selection or micro-players’ utility
functions that induce a game with better properties have to be researched.
Lastly, we have assumed that the opponent player’s strategy is static up to this point.
In practical examples, it is more natural to think that opponent players also try to opti-
mize their strategies even though their rationality is limited. If opponent players start to
adapt their strategies, their strategies are time-varying and consequently, utility functions
of micro-players like (8) and (14) are also time-varying functions. These time-varying util-
ity functions are related to the results regarding stochastic stability in drifting environments
from Chapter 3. More details about team-based zero-sum games with dynamically adapting
opponents will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
PAYOFF-BASED COORDINATION IN DRIFTING
ENVIRONMENTS
This chapter combines the results of the previous two chapters by considering a problem of
coordinating actions without communications in drifting environments. More specifically,
it is assumed that the opponent player in the team-based zero-sum games from the previous
chapter tries to adjust its strategy in the set of bounded recall strategies.
The first section analyses the team-based zero-sum games with adaptive opponents and
some simulation results are shown. In the second section, we developed the human testbed
program for further study regarding a human as an adaptive opponent in the team-based
zero-sum games. A user of the human testbed program is supposed to play series of stages
of the zero-sum game against a team of virtual players.
5.1 Team-based zero-sum games with adaptive opponents
Consider a team-based zero-sum game G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ) described in
Chapter 4 again. In the previous chapter, it was assumed that the opponent player PY ’s
bounded recall strategy σ ∈ Σk was static, and consequently the team players’ average
payoff function φLσ in (7) was also static. A static strategy σ means that the opponent
player never changes his strategy during run time. However in many practical applications,
it is more natural to think that the opponent player also tries to learn and adapt his strategy.
Assume that the opponent adapts his strategy σ within a bounded recall strategy set Σk.
Let σt ∈ Σk be the opponent’s strategy at time t. Suppose that the opponent’s adapting
speed is slow, i.e., |σt − σt−1| is bounded with some small value regardless a method used
to adapt the opponent’s strategy. Then one can easily recognize the connection between
this example and Theorem 3.2.2 in Chapter 3. Note that in Lemma 4.6.1 and Lemma 4.7.1,
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the game G has a corresponding normal form game Ĝ = ({P i,jX }, {Xi}, {Uσi,j}) of micro-
players. Similarly, for every opponent’s strategy σt ∈ Σk, we will denote the equivalent
normal form game of micro-players as Ĝt. Then the slowly varying opponent’s strategy σ
in Ĝt plays the same role as the environment parameter θ in Theorem 3.2.2. The following
corollaries are direct consequences of Chapter 3.
Corollary 5.1.1. Consider a team-based zero-sum game G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ).
Suppose that the team players {P1X ,P2X} play the micro-player matching with either a se-
rial ID sequence or a de Bruijn ID sequence. Assume that PY plays a bounded recall
strategy σt ∈ Σk at time t. Then for every ε, there exist δ > 0 and learning parameters
such that
|σt − σt−1| < δ
for all t = 0, 1, 2... implies that the team-players joint behavior at t constitutes an ε-Nash
equilibrium of the the equivalent game Ĝt of micro-players with probability at least 1− ε.
Proof. Team players with micro-player matching update their action sequences every end
of action sequence period, hence one can consider the system as a perturbed Markov pro-
cess evolving period-by-period over the set of joint action sequences,
∏L
l=1X . For each
opponent’s static strategy σ ∈ Σk, let P εσ be a Markov process induced by the micro-player
matching. Define µ∗σ ∈ ∆(
∏L
l=1X) as the associated stationary distribution over the finite
set of L-length joint action sequence. Then the rest of proof is easily induced from the
results of the previous chapters.
5.1.1 Simulations
This section presents simulations of the micro-player matching against an adapting oppo-
nent. Most of simulation setting is similar to Section 4.7.3 except the opponent player.
Consider a team-based zero-sum game G = ({P1X ,P2X ,PY }, {X1, X2, Y }, φ) where the
action sets for players were X1 = X2 = Y = {1, 2, 3}. The team players’ payoff function
φ : X1 × X2 × Y → R is 1 if x1 = x2 = y, and 0 otherwise. The opponent PY has
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a time-varying bounded recall strategy with order k = 4, i.e., σ ∈ Σ4. Each of the team
players P1X and P2X had m = 3 micro-players, and the micro-player ID sequence s was
selected from the set of de Bruijn sequences B(m, k + 1) = B(3, 5).
Define hk(t) ∈
∏k
l=1X as a k-length joint history of the team players at time t, i.e.,
hk(t) = (x(t− k), x(t− k + 1), ..., x(t− 1)).
Every time step t, PY selects its action y(t) ∈ Y according to its bounded recall strategy
σt :
∏k
l=1X → ∆(Y ). In other words, PY assigns a probability distribution σt(hk) ∈
∆(Y ) to every available k-length joint action history hk ∈
∏k
l=1X of the team players.
Based on the observed joint action profile x(t), the opponent’s strategy σt is updated with
the following rule.
σt+1(hk(t))← α · vx(t) + (1− α) · σt(hk(t))
σt+1(h
′
k)← σt(h′k), ∀h′k 6= hk(t)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a learning rate and vx(t) ∈ ∆(Y ) is a uniform distribution over the
set Y \ {x1(t), x2(t)}. In other words, the opponent adapts his strategy by decreasing
the probability of the actions played by the team players. In simulations, the opponent’s
adapting speed |σt+1 − σt| is bounded by limiting the parameter α to be small.
Figure 16 shows the simulation results of the team-based zero-sum game against the
adaptive opponent illustrated above. First, Figure 16 (a) shows the opponent’s ability to
adapt his strategy against static team players. In this simulation, the team players played
the same static and periodic action sequence and did not update it during the simulation.
The result shows that the opponent could successfully optimize his strategy so that the
average reward of the team players converges to zero after sufficiently large time.
Next, the simulation result of the micro-player matching method against the adaptive
opponent is shown in Figure 16 (b). Contrary to the simulation result in Figure 16 (a), the
team players could adapt their action sequences against the opponent who adapted its strat-
egy dynamically. The average rewards of the team were maintained in some neighborhood
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(a) team players with a static and periodic joint action sequence against the adapting oppo-
nent











(b) team players with the micro-player matching algorithm against the adapting opponent
Figure 16: Team players’ average rewards against the adapting opponent. The dotted lines
are drawn at 1
3
which is a maxmin reward of the correlated equilibrium of the game. With
the micro-player matching method, the team players could adapt their action sequences
against the opponent who adapted its strategy dynamically.
of 1
3
which was a maxmin reward of the correlated equilibrium of the game. Hence the
simulation results indicates that the micro-player matching works against a opponent who
dynamically adapts its strategy with sufficiently slow speed.
5.2 Micro-player matching against humans
In this section, a graphical user interface (GUI) human testbed program is developed to
experiment the micro-player matching against humans. A real person will act and make
choice as an opponent with limited rationality in team-based zero-sum games.
Rationality of humans has been a popular research topic in the behavioural and social
sciences, and ’rationality’ can be viewed as an aspect of reasoning in decision making [73].
Even though the decision making process of human is not completely understood yet, large
empirical evidence of human behaviour showed that human rationality is not perfect. In
economics which is a largely model-based science, lots of models of rational choice take
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into account limitations of human capacities as bounded rationality [74]. Referring to the
citation [73], some typical assumptions on the limitation of human abilities in economy
theory are as follows; i) limited knowledge of the world, ii) limited ability to evoke this
knowledge, iii) limited ability to cope with uncertainty, and iv) limited ability to evoke
possible courses of action.
Even though we cannot argue that bounded recall strategy is the best model for ratio-
nality of humans, we believe that testing micro-player matching algorithm against a human
is still a meaningful test. One can find the similarity between the bounded rationality model
and limited rationality of human in the sense that people apparently have limited memory
when trying to memorize a long sequence of symbols.
5.2.1 Human testbed program
A simple human testbed program (see Figure 17) is developed using MATLAB for the
experiments. The team-based zero-sum game G applied for the testbed is similar to the
illustrative example in Chapter 4.3. All players, including a human participant and two
virtual team players, have the same action set {left,right}. A human participant loses the
stage if all three players choose the same action, or wins the stage otherwise. The game is
repeated until a user stops the program.
The testbed program consists of the following functions.
• Play a stage by selecting an action among {left,right}
• Reset all history and parameters
• Save the current setting and play history as a separate file
• Quit the program
The program displays the current time steps (i.e., the stage number) and the participant’s
average winning rate during the test. A user can select an action by pressing a left or right
arrow key on a keyboard, or clicking a button on the screen. Whenever a user selects an
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Figure 17: Human testbed program. Both Player 1 and Player 2 are at a neutral position
which is the middle of the left and right boxes while waiting for the user’s input. Once the
user selects his action, then each Player 1 and Player 2 moves to one of the left and right
boxes according to their actions.
action, the virtual team players, Player1 and Player2, immediately select their own actions
using the micro-player matching, then the result is visually displayed on the program. Then
for a user’s intuitive recognition, the result whether the user won or lost the stage is shown
in the box selected by the user. Figure 18 shows the sample screen shots when the user
wins or loses a stage against the team players.
In the human testbed program, it is important to make sure that the team players’ action
sequences have an appropriate length. Testing with impractically long action sequences
(e.g. sequence with more than 30-length period) against a human participant will take too
much time. Moreover there is a risk that experiment participants might be overwhelmed
by the length of the sequence and give up to adapt his actions. On the other hand, if
the sequence length is too short then the game is too trivial for participants. Hence the
sequence length L was selected as a random number between 9 to 13, and the selected
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(a) Example when a user won the stage. The user chose ‘left’ while
the virtual team-players chose ‘right’
(b) Example when a user lost the stage. All players including the user
and virtual team-players chose ‘left’
Figure 18: Screenshots of the program when a user won and lost the stage. A picture with
facial expression helps the user to intuitively recognize a result of each stage.
length is unknown to the user.
The following information about the system was informed to participants before exper-
iments.
• Game rules such as the available action set and condition for winning the stage
• Each team player repeats its own action sequence while gradually adapts it with some
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algorithm.
• The period of the team players’ action sequences is randomly selected between 9 to
13 at the start of the test.
• The team players cannot observe the participant’s action or its team-mate’s action.
• The team players can only observe the result whether they won or lost the stage.
5.2.2 Test results
To demonstrate the developed human testbed program, this section presents brief analy-
sis of the test results with experiment participants. Note that the purpose of this section
is not exhaustive study about correlated behavior learning against humans. However the
developed testbed program can be utilized for the further in-depth research about the topic.
Experiments were performed with three participants and each participant played two
sessions of the game. Each session was conducted for 300 stages. In the first session, the
team players repeated static action sequences without any learning algorithm. Both players
had the same static action sequence so that the team players always selected the same
action with a prescribed order. The static action sequences were randomly selected during
the initialization before starting the experiments. In this case, if the experiment participant
could memorize the sequence perfectly then they could always win the game against the
virtual team players.
In the second session, the team players adapted their action sequences using the micro-
player matching with a serial ID sequence illustrated in Section 4.6.1. The initial action
sequence was independently selected for each player so that the team players’ actions were
not coordinated at the start of the experiments. As explained in the previous section, the
sequence length L was a random number between 9 to 13 and unknown to the participants.
The experiment results are shown in Figure 19. Because the static action sequence given
to each participant was randomly selected, the pattern of the static action sequence for a
specific participant could be more complex than others. Hence a participant might feel
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Figure 19: The human testbed program results with three experiment participants. In each
graph, the blue line and red line are the average winning rates of the participant against a
static action sequence and a team of players with micro-player matching method respec-
tively.
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it was trickier to remember the sequence than other participants during the early stages.
Nonetheless, it was commonly observed in all participant’s test results that the winning
rate against a static action sequence converged to almost one at the end of the session.
On the other hand, the winning rates against the micro-player matching method were
not improved during the session for all participants. One can interpret the results as that the
micro-player matching method could successfully hamper the human participant’s learning.
5.3 Summary
This chapter presented coordination with no communications in drifting environments by
considering team-based zero-sum games in which an opponent dynamically adapts its strat-
egy. It is assumed that the opponent player’s learning speed is slow enough so that its strat-
egy is gradually changed within a bounded recall strategy set. Then the team of players can
learn correlated behavior with the micro-player matching method.
Moreover, a GUI human testbed program is developed to experiment the micro-player
matching against humans. Even though the exact model for the rationality of humans is not
understood yet, there is some similarity between the bounded recall strategy and limited
rationality of human. A thorough research regarding game theoretic learnings against hu-
man is beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, we believe that testing micro-player
matching algorithm against a human is an interesting topic and the test results presented in
this chapter suggest the future research direction.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze and develop game theoretic distributed control
under dynamic and challenging conditions: drifting environments and constrained com-
munications. In this chapter, we will conclude our research regarding the two challenging
settings then discuss future research directions.
6.1 Robustness of stochastic stability
The effects of two types of environmental disturbances have been analyzed in terms of
stochastic stability which is a notion of convergence in game theoretic learning. The first
setup involves perturbed dynamics. One motivation in the game theoretic learning frame-
work stems from a presumed ability to measure utility functions. These computations may
require estimates from persistently noisy measurements or may neglect latent state vari-
ables. We establish a continuity result that shows how small perturbations to the learning
rule induce small effects on the limiting stochastic behaviors. The second setup concerns
slowly varying dynamics, i.e., drifting environments. A standard assumption in game the-
oretic learning is a stationary environment, e.g., the game is fixed. We investigate the case
of slow variations and show that for sufficiently slow time variations, the limiting behavior
“tracks” the stochastically stable states. Since the analysis s regarding Markov processes,
the results could be applied to various game theoretic learning rules. In this thesis, the
results were applied to log-linear learning and the mobile sensor coverage example was
tested in both simulation and laboratory experiments.
6.2 Correlated behavior in payoff-based learning
In the second part of this dissertation, we researched a payoff-based correlated behavior
learning under the presence of hostile opponents. It was assumed that team players have
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limited observability, and an opponent has limited rationality. The task for the team players
is to learn correlated behavior without communications while not disclosing their behavior
to the opponent.
Achieving correlated behavior is one of the major concerns in distributed learnings, and
it generally requires some common signals that can be observed by all players. However,
in completely uncoupled settings, common signals or communications are impossible for
a group of players so that much research has only concerned about independently mixed
strategies. On the other hand, we considered that ‘time’ is a common signal that implicitly
always shared by all players in repeated game settings. Players can correlate their actions
to time steps by playing deterministic and periodic action sequences instead of random-
ized one-shot strategies. It is shown that the length of sequence is related to the level of
opponent’s rationality.
We have introduced a notion of micro-players to improve periodic action sequence
learning. Then adapting a joint action sequence is interpreted as matching micro-players
in each team player. Moreover by introducing a de Bruijn sequence, we could successfully
separate the level of opponent’s rationality and the size of the game of micro-players.
The micro-player matching method provides a new frame that converts the original
team-based zero-sum game to a game between micro-players. In our research, we consid-
ered specific existing algorithms such that log-linear learning and regret testing as learning
algorithms for each micro-player. But one may apply other existing payoff-based learnings
and proper utility designs to achieve better equilibrium selection and/or learning rate.
6.3 Future directions
Future research for game theoretic learning in drifting environments includes application to
distributed robotics systems. Also one can develop a model of the environmental variations
to help reduce the time scale separation required in this approach.
For the micro-player matching method, future work should focus on in-depth research
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about the learning rate of the proposed methods and phase-locking process that is robust to
larger phase differences In the de Bruijn ID sequence approach, the uncertainty coefficient
was utilized for phase-locking process between team players. However, the exact limi-
tations and characteristics of the uncertainty coefficient as an association measurement is
not completely analyzed yet. Payoff-based phase-locking mechanism with the uncertainty
coefficient should be explored in future.
Also the de Bruijn ID sequence approach has an optimality issue. A regret testing
rule applied as a micro-player’s learning algorithm converges to neighborhood of a Nash
equilibrium of a normal form game between micro-players. However a Nash equilibrium
is not necessarily an optimal point of the game, and thus the resulted behavior of micro-
player matching with de Bruijn ID sequence may not be optimal. For better results, a
proper equilibrium selection or micro-players’ utility functions that induce a game with
better properties have to be researched.
Lastly, the developed GUI human testbed program can be a starting point for studying
game theoretic correlated behavior learning against a human.
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